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DOD reduced military force structure after the Cold War ended.  More efficient 
and sophisticated weapons are necessary to support a smaller force.  Acquisition reform 
legislation is designed to capture savings and usher in a Revolution in Business Affairs.  
Today a wide array of rogue nations, transnational actors, and domestic terrorism demand 
weapons procurement reform that is effective against a smaller and much less visible foe.  
The Department of Defense’s goal is to deliver modern, high performance weapons 
systems at lower cost, on schedule and with higher performance.  Better weaponry drives 
the reality that the nation and the Department find themselves in, an era of highly 
unpredictable security challenges.  This research paper explores major procurement 
reforms and their effect on decreasing the amount of time and funds expended on current 
and future weapons systems.  It looks for evidence of how the Department of the Navy’s 
budget is impacted and what controls, if any, these reforms will have on future weapons 
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DOD reduced force structure after the Cold War threat disappeared, including 
reductions in civilian and military personnel and facilities associated with the armed 
forces.  Weapons designed to combat the Soviet threat made weapon development easier.  
The 1990s capped a decade of unprecedented economic growth of the stock market and 
individual wealth.  There was less emphasis on DOD funding in general and weapons 
procurement in particular.  As DOD reduced programmed procurement in successive 
FYDPs, it has reprogrammed some procurement to the years beyond the FYDP, creating 
a bow wave of demand for procurement funds.  More efficient and sophisticated weapons 
are necessary to support a smaller force.  Acquisition reform legislation was designed to 
capture savings and usher in a Revolution in Business Affairs.  Today, the Department of 
Defense’s goal has been to deliver modern, high performance weapons systems at lower 
cost, and with higher performance.  Better weaponry drives the reality that the nation and 
the Department find themselves in, an era of highly unpredictable security challenges.  
Today a wide array of rogue nations, transnational actors, and domestic terrorism demand 
weapons procurement reform that is effective against a smaller and much less visible foe.  
DOD has been unable to follow through with planned funding increases for modern 
weapon systems.  This occurred in part due to DOD repeatedly shifting planned funding 
increases for modern weapon systems further into the future with each succeeding future 
years defense plan (FYDP).  This research paper explores major procurement reforms 
and their effect on decreasing the amount of time and funds expended on current and 
future weapons systems.  It will look for evidence of how the Department of the Navy’s 
budget is impacted and what controls, if any, these reforms will have on future weapons 
procurement.  The link between the Executive and legislative branches, DOD and 































This thesis deals with the acquisition reforms of the late 1980s and early to mid-
1990s driven by a smaller military industrial complex, a need for quicker, more efficient 
acquisition and limited acquisition funding.  This thesis will examine ten years of 
acquisition reform by exploring major procurement laws and their effect on decreasing 
the amount of time and funds expended on current and future weapon systems.  It will 
look for evidence of how the Department of the Navy’s budget is impacted and what 
controls, if any, these reforms will have on future weapons procurement.  This thesis cites 
major procurement laws and examines their relevance to Navy weapons procurement.  
There is a thorough focus on expert testimony from Congressional hearings, GAO 
reports, industry and DOD witnesses and program managers to examine the effectiveness 
of procurement changes. This thesis provides two Case Studies focused on Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs budgets to support or counter the significance of 
procurement reform in the Navy.   
 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This thesis looks at DOD procurement reforms that occurred in the last ten years 
and their effect on Navy weapons procurement.  The primary objective of this analysis 
will be to analyze the Navy’s acquisition of major weapons systems before and after the 
advent of major reforms.  Acquisition strategies at the program managers’ level 
emphasizes and identifies methods of weapons procurement management employed to 
maximize the program’s effectiveness.  This thesis has a secondary objective of 
determining whether DON acquisition reform has been universal in its success or failure 
as revealed in the Case Studies. 
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 C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
1. Primary Research Questions 
What effect has Department of Defense procurement reform had on Navy weapon 
procurement accounts? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
A. Has Navy weapon’s procurement realized improvement in real dollars 
with the advent of acquisition reform? 
B. Were cost savings in Navy weapons systems procurement programs 
realized? 
C. Have funding trends in ACAT I programs matched procurement dollars 
over the last ten years? 
D. Has the Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) enabled more 
effective acquisition management of scarce dollars? 
E. How do the Navy weapons procurement dollar budgeting and performance 
measures compare with those of the Army and Air Force? 
F. How are weapon accounts affected by decreased procurement dollars? 
G. Has the Program Manager realized programmatic success in defense 
procurement reform? 
 
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis provides an overview of the Federal Budget Process and its specific 
relationship to procurement accounts.  This thesis examines the effects of diminished 
procurement funding on other DOD and Navy accounts.  This thesis will provide 
historical graphs and displays illustrating procurement trends.  This thesis briefly 
discusses Budget Authority, Total Obligation Authority and Outlays over the 
procurement reform period.  This thesis provides an analysis of the program office’s role 
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in defending its procurement dollars to determine its effectiveness in procurement reform.  
It also provides an analysis of procurement funding management techniques employed by 
two ACAT I (MDAP) program offices.  The procurement programs Case Analyses are 
cross-compared to determine if they support or disprove the effectiveness of acquisition 
reform. 
 
E. LIMITATIONS OF SCOPE 
Due to time constraints and the availability of data, this thesis will not provide an 
in depth analysis of the Federal Budget process, including PPBS and DOD budgeting.  It 
will not provide an in depth analysis of contract management and acquisition reform.  It 
will not provide an in depth analysis of simplified acquisition reform; or an in depth 
analysis of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA); or an in depth 
analysis of the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA).  It will not provide an 
in depth analysis of ACAT I or Major Defense Acquisition Programs. 
 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology used in this thesis consisted of the following steps: 
1. A literature search of books, magazine articles, trade journals, World 
Wide Web, DOD references, DON references and other library 
information sources. 
2. An examination of Congressional hearings, GAO Reports, DOD IG 
reports and statements of DOD witnesses. 
3. Personal interviews of NPS faculty with program management and 
weapons procurement experience.  This thesis provides a list of questions 
for NPS faculty. 
4. Identification of major procurement laws in contracting and acquisition 
reform over the past ten years. 
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G. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
 
This thesis is primarily intended to benefit students of the weapons procurement 
process by providing insight on procurement reform trends and a cross analysis of two 
ACAT I programs.  This study will provide acquisition professionals with anecdotal 
information on the successes and failures of weapons procurement from their 
contemporaries, and will elicit open discussion and analysis on the efficiency of 
acquisition processes. 
 
H. NPS FACULTY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
A. How does the PM lobby funding for support for his program? 
B. What documents in the POM process do you receive to request program funding? 
C. After budget approval from Congress, how do you receive funding?   
D. How does the PM determine his/her program funding (budget)? 
E. How does the PM execute his/her budget? 
F. Does the Program Manager buy more items than necessary, rather than manage to 
need?   
G. Does the PM return excess funds? 
H. Is the PM able to determine how much money he/she is managing and where that 
money is going on a real time or near real time basis?  Specifically, does the PM 
interface with MOCAS?  How well are funds tracked in MOCAS? 
I. Should there be a better solution to MOCAS? 
J. Is the PM’s initial cost estimate optimistic?  Why or why not? 
K. Are subsequent cost estimates optimistic?  
L. Does the contractor make up costs with suggested contract modifications? 
M. How does the PM manage cost overruns? 
N. Does the PM proceed with LRIP without completely demonstrating the weapon 
system works?  If yes, under what circumstances?  If yes, is cost the main driver?   
O. How does the PM manage programmatic cuts? 
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P. If the program is a “lemon”, does the PM continue to support it?  
Q. Are projected program savings used to justifying a program’s existence?  In your 
experience, have projected savings, if any, enhanced the program’s life? 
R. Is there a military culture to produce weapons whether needed or not? 
S. Has MDAP helped acquisition/procurement at the PM level? 
T. Have FARA/FASA, CAIV, DOD 5000.2R policy changes etc., helped the PM 
manage his program?   
U. What special techniques are employed by the PM to ensure current year funding 
meets minimum requirements? 
 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter I outline the methodology used, approaching DOD procurement reform 
with specific attention to DON Major Defense Acquisition Programs.  Today’s DOD 
faces myriad challenges that had not existed in the past and/or were not as significant as 
today.  Rogue nations, transnational actors, global and domestic terrorism coupled with 
shrinking defense procurement dollars replaced the Soviet threat.  The nation and DOD 
find themselves in an era of new highly unpredictable security challenges.  A shrinking 
defense industrial complex with limited competition for weapons procurement and a 
changing global environment drove weapon procurement reforms.  DOD repeatedly 
shifted planned funding increases for modern weapon systems resulting in a bow wave of 
procurement in the out years.   
 
The challenge is capturing the appropriate funding to acquire the proper weaponry 
in the future.  An examination of improved methods of conducting weapons procurement 
results in greater US security. This thesis hopes to promote further discussion and offers 
recommendations on controls affecting DON’s budget.  Specifically it looks to determine 
if ten years of procurement reform has helped or hindered weapons acquisition in a 
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II. OVERVIEW OF NAVY PROCUREMENT REFORM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Acquiring weapons for military forces is central to accomplishing the Department 
of Defense's (DOD) mission.  However, pervasive problems persist in the process of 
acquiring weapons, including cost, schedule, and performance estimating errors; accurate 
estimates of program affordability; and acquiring weapons based on optimistic 
assumptions about the maturity and availability of enabling technologies.1  The existence 
of outdated legacy systems makes the ability to accurately track and measure 
procurement costs even more difficult.  Thus, weapons procurement reform is driven by a 
myriad of factors borne out of DOD’s desire to acquire the best weaponry at the least 
cost.  Tension exists between top-level players like Congress, Defense Acquisition 
Executives and mid-level officials like program managers and comptrollers because of 
limited resources.  Before discussing existing programmatic tensions, this chapter 
provides background information on major procedural, regulatory and legislative 
reforms.  Some of the reforms discussed have historical implications, but are no longer 
substantive as a stand-alone requirement.  For example, the Federal Acquisition Reform 
Act (FARA) and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) have been 
incorporated into other instructions.  DOD 5000.2R is being revised as well.   
 
In each case, these policy documents or legislation address significant acquisition 
reform initiatives.  Program managers are provided tools, in the form of regulations and 
funding which enable them to procure weapons.  This chapter lays the foundation for 
further discussion of techniques employed by program managers.  Discussion of these 
initiatives does not necessarily correlate with their applicability to day-to-day program 
management.  It merely identifies and clarifies tools available to the program manager. 
7
B. PROCUREMENT REFORM 
 
Increasing procurement costs led to increased reliance on commercial products 
and processes.2  Moreover, the Defense Department’s limited investment budget is 
constrained by a relatively stable top-line budget and squeezed by increased operations 
and support costs from aging weapon systems.3  The Defense Department is in the midst 
of a revolution in business affairs (RBA) with 3 goals in mind.  First, it wants to field 
high quality defense products to reduce average acquisition systems cycle time for all 
MDAPs by 25 percent (132 months to 99 months).  DOD wants to lower total ownership 
costs (TOC) of defense products, with the goal of minimizing cost growth in MDAPs to 
no greater than 1 percent annually.  Finally, reduced overhead costs will result in less 
expensive weapons platforms.4   
 
1. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 
DOD issued an update to its regulations governing the acquisition of major 
weapon systems on 13 October 1994.  Among other things, the update incorporated new 
laws and policies, including the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, separated 
mandatory policies and procedures from discretionary practices, and reduced the volume 
and complexity of the regulations.  
 
FASA required the SECDEF to define cost, schedule and performance goals for 
all of the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and for each phase of their 
acquisition cycle.  Highlights included streamlined proposal information or page count; 
shortened proposal submission time; shortened evaluation team size or evaluation time; 
and limited source selection factors pertaining to cost, past experience, performance or 
quality of content.  FASA called for full and open competition, which is obtained when 
“all responsible sources are permitted to submit sealed bids for competitive proposals5 
(FAR).  Full and open competition is achieved through open specifications6.   
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FASA established a clear preference for acquisition of commercial items in 
federal procurement.  It requires agencies to reduce impediments to and train appropriate 
personnel in the acquisition of commercial products.  One such impediment is the use of 
design specifications, which restrict competition and make acquisition of commercial 
products difficult.  Design specifications typically tell a vendor how a product is to be 
made or how a service is to be performed.  A commercial vendor, whose product has 
been developed for public use, seldom conforms to the government’s design 
specifications.  FASA instilled flexibility, and timeliness into the acquisition process. 
 
2. Federal Acquisition Reform Act/Clinger-Cohen Act 
The major pieces of legislation affecting the acquisition and information 
technology world were the Federal Acquisition Reform Act and the Information 
Technology Management Reform Act. While originally passed as two separate 
initiatives, their impact on each other made it impossible to enact each singularly. The 
two acts were later combined and renamed the Clinger-Cohen Act. 
 
The major impact on information technology was the repeal of the Brooks Act 
and its associated restriction on procurement of resources. Clinger-Cohen encourages the 
acquisition of commercial off the shelf (COTS) IT products and allows the Office for 
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to conduct pilot programs in federal agencies to test 
alternative approaches for acquisition of IT resources.  The Act directs agencies to use 
“modular contracting” based on successive acquisitions of “interoperable increments”.7  
The Act created the Chief Information Officer and for the Department of Defense, it 
combined life cycle approvals for weapon systems and information technology systems 
into a single instruction, the DOD 5000.1 series.  
 
FARA and FASA have been overtaken or superseded by other reform documents, 
processes or legislation.  For purposes of this thesis, research was limited to those directly 
applying to MDAPs and weapons procurement.  Additional reforms involve fostering the 
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development of measurable cost, schedule, and performance goals and incentives for 
acquisition personnel to reach those goals.  Among other things, program managers (as 
well as senior DOD and Departmental officials) must establish cost, schedule, and 
performance goals for acquisition programs and annually report on their progress in 
meeting those goals.  They must establish personnel performance incentives linked to the 
achievement of the goals.  Program Executive Offices must submit recommendations for 
legislation to facilitate the management of acquisition programs and the acquisition 
workforce.   
 
a. Federal Acquisition Regulations, Part 12 (FAR) 
FAR applies to all contracting regulations.  The pertinent part of the FAR 
with regard to commercial off the shelf reforms (COTS) is part 12.  Essentially, 
organizations (DOD in this case) should perform market research to maximize the use of 
commercial products.  Weapon programs must purchase commercial or non-
developmental items (CNDI) when they are available and when they meet the 
organizations needs.  Contractors are required to incorporate CNDI to the maximum 
extent possible. 
 
Leading commercial firms are getting the kinds of outcomes from their 
development of new products that the Department sought.  Specifically, firms were 
developing increasingly sophisticated products in significantly less time and at lower cost 
than their predecessors.  The quality and credibility of cost information available to DOD 
decision-makers remain a problem.  For example, the Navy's reported costs for ships 
under construction did not include all relevant costs, such as those for outfitting and post 
delivery.8   
 
b. Cost as An Independent Variable 
DOD Directive 5000.1 communicates operational needs into stable, 
affordable programs like Cost as An Independent Variable (CAIV).  System performance 
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and target costs are determined on a cost-performance tradeoff basis.  The acquisition 
process will make cost more of a constraint and less a variable thus ensuring 
effectiveness and suitability of the system.  CAIV reduces procurement costs.  After 
Desert Storm and before the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, threats were not 
increasing in perceived capability at as fast a rate.  DOD’s acquisition budget decreased 
accordingly.  It was more appropriate to make cost a stronger driver in system design due 
to decreased budgets.  Such an approach is also more consistent with commercial 
practices in new system developments, where market forces drive the price of a new 
system.   
 
The research firm Coopers and Lybrand identified over 120 regulatory and 
statutory "cost drivers" that, according to the contractors surveyed, increases the price 
DOD pays for goods and services by 18 percent9.  Some of the more egregious cost 
drivers included government imposed accounting and reporting standards and systems 
such as Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) and complex contract requirements and 
statements of work (SOW).10The basic principles of the study were to develop a more 
“commercial-like” defense procurement process.  This includes reducing regulatory 
burden; transferring more program cost, design and technology control authority and 
responsibility to the contractor; exploiting commercially developed parts, components, 
technologies and processes; and making cost/price a key requirement.11  This study was 
used to support the Revolution in Business Affairs.  Free and open competition, CAIV, 
and streamlined procurement procedures and more effective program management are 
some of the substantial changes in the last ten years of procurement reform.  Establishing 
free and open competition is just part of procurement reform.  Changes in IT procurement 
from the Clinger-Cohen Act included using cost as an independent variable as a means of 
reducing procurement costs is another. 
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c. Single Process Initiative 
 
The Secretary of Defense directed DOD to change the management and 
manufacturing requirements of existing contracts and unify them within one facility, 
where appropriate.  This initiative is called the block change or single process initiative 
(SPI).  PMs are tasked with ensuring SPI reduces weapon procurement costs.   
 
Allowing defense contractors to use a single process in their facilities is a 
natural progression from the contract-by-contract process of removing military-unique 
specifications and standards initiated in FASA.  Contractors will incur transition costs 
that equal or exceed savings in the near term.  Moving to common, facility-wide 
requirements will reduce government and contractor costs in the long term, however12.   
 
3. Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) 
To be considered a MDAP, an acquisition program must either be designated by 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD 
(AT&L)) as an MDAP or estimated by the USD (AT&L) to require an eventual total 
expenditure for RDT&E of more than $365M in FY00 constant dollars or more than 
$2.190B in procurement in FY00 constant dollars.  DOD 5000.2-R applies primarily to 
major acquisition programs.  It’s recommended during program definition, principally 
regarding requirements evolutions and system supportability that integrated process 
teams (IPT) are used.  Program structure recommendations include an acquisition 
strategy of open systems.  The program manager, to maximize the program’s 
effectiveness, should use commercial sources, risk management, and CAIV.  The PM 
should use program design incorporating integrated product and process development 
(IPPD) and by placing system engineering emphasis on producibility, quality, acquisition 
logistics and open system design13.    
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SECDEF recently directed DOD 5000.2R conversion from a regulatory document 
into a functional and more flexible policy document.  The 5000 series requires important 
user requirements like the operational requirements document (ORD) and initial 
operational capability.  The 5000.2R procurement requirements are firm and not subject 
to change14.  SECDEF, the services and program managers need flexibility to manage 
procurement funds.  The old 5000.2R made sense because it expressed a preference for 
logisticians to be more involved in procurement.  DOD estimated that it is spending about 
$59B a year on logistics support to operate and sustain weapon systems.  Logistician 
involvement is designed to save O&M dollars by providing feedback on designing 
effective systems and how to improve procurement delivery times15.  Weapon systems 
program offices are responsible for analyzing the cost-effectiveness of contractor support 
approaches in developing life-cycle support plans, in accordance with DOD 5000.2R.  
The new document promises to piggy-back on recent procurement reform, allowing 
greater flexibility and control for procurement leadership. 
 
a. Reduce MDAP Acquisition Costs 
Weapon programs establish an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) to 
document the cost, schedule and performance objectives and thresholds of that program 
beginning at program initiation.  The program manager prepares the APB at program 
initiation for acquisition category programs, and at each subsequent major milestone 
decision, and following a program restructure or an unrecoverable program deviation.  
APBs contain objectives for cost, schedule and performance parameters.  The specificity 
and number of performance parameters evolve as the program is better defined.  The 
schedule parameters include program initiation, major milestone decision points, initial 
operating capability and any other critical system events.  These critical events are 
proposed by the PM and approved by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for each 
program.   
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b. Director of Acquisition Program Initiative 
Annually, the Director of Acquisition Program Integration determines if 
each MDAP has reached 90 percent or more of its cost, schedule, and performance 
parameters when compared to acquisition program baseline thresholds.  The appropriate 
decision authority must make a similar determination for non-major acquisition 
programs.  If 10 percent or more of a program's parameters are missed, a timely review is 
required.  The review addresses any breaches in cost, schedule and performance and to 
recommend suitable action, including termination.  Major acquisition defense program 
baselines must be coordinated with DOD's Comptroller before approval16.   
 
Cost parameters are limited to RDT&E costs, procurement costs, the costs 
of acquisition of items procured with operations and maintenance funds, total quantity 
and average unit procurement cost.  (Average unit cost equals total procurement cost 
divided by total procurement quantity).  As the program progresses through later 
acquisition phases, procurement costs are refined based on contractor actual costs from 
program definition and risk reduction (PDRR), engineering, manufacturing and 
development or from initial production lots.   
 
Cost, schedule and performance objectives are used through the cost as an 
independent variable (CAIV) process17.  Cost, schedule and performance may be traded-
off by the PM, within the range between the objective and the threshold without 
obtaining MDA approval.  If not managed well, cost overruns will occur.  Today, there 
are increased costs for weapon replacement.  Figure 1 illustrates the cost to improve the 
AAV.  The AAAV is the Marine Corps only ACAT I program, consuming the bulk of the 
Marine Corps’ procurement dollars when it begins full rate production.  The question is 
not so much how much it costs but whether the Marine Corps can afford it.18  Dramatic 
increases in specifications, like increased water speed of 25 knots from 7 knots; the 
ability to keep up with the main battle tank at 30 mph versus 20 mph for the AAV; 
increased range on water of 65 miles versus 45 miles, contributed to AAAV’s higher cost 
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Figure 1.   Increased Cost of Doing Business 
CAIV helps the PM recognize that the majority of costs are determined 
early in a program’s life cycle. The best time to reduce life-cycle costs is early in the 
acquisition process.  Cost reductions are accomplished through cost and performance 
tradeoff analysis, which is conducted before an acquisition approach is finalized.   
Incentives are applied to both government and industry to achieve the objectives of 
CAIV20.  Awards programs and “shared savings” programs are used creatively to 
encourage generation of cost-saving ideas for all phases of life-cycle costs.  Incentive 
programs target individuals and government and industry teams.  The PM works closely 
with the user to achieve proper balance among cost, schedule and performance while 
ensuring that systems are both affordable and cost-effective.  The PM, together with the 
user, proposes cost objectives and thresholds for MDA approval, which will then be 
controlled through the APB process21.  The PM searches continually for innovative 
practices to reduce life-cycle environmental costs and liability. 
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4. Acquisition Category (ACAT) I 
ACAT I programs are Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).  An 
MDAP is defined as a program estimated by the Under Secretary for Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology) (USD (A&T)) that requires eventual expenditure for 
RDT&E of more than $365M (FY00 constant dollars) or procurement of more than 
$2.190B (FY00 constant dollars), or those designated by the USD (A&T) to be ACAT I.  
There are three major acquisition categories, ACAT I, ACAT IA and ACAT II governed 
by DOD22.  ACAT ID (defense) and ACAT IC (component or individual service) are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.  ACAT IA and ACAT II programs are not 
relevant to the thesis and will not be discussed.   
 
a. DOD’s Effect on Navy Procurement Reform 
Milestones are major decision points for weapons systems.  The milestone 
review process is predicated on the principle that systems advance to higher acquisition 
phases by demonstrating that they have met prescribed technical specifications and 
performance thresholds.  For all ACAT I programs, a life cycle cost estimate is prepared 
by the program manager in support of program initiation and all subsequent milestone 
reviews.  The Navy PM establishes, as a basis for life-cycle cost estimates, a description 
of the salient features of the acquisition program and of the system itself23.  The Navy’s 
Component Acquisition Executive, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 
Development and Acquisition) (ASN (RD&A)) prepares the budget estimate for ACAT I 
programs in support of Milestones II and Milestone III.  ASN (RD&A) exercises line 
management over Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and direct reporting program 
managers.24  The PEO generally relies on hardware systems commands for administrative 
support, including comptroller functions for financial management.  The fund-flow for 
both PEO and hardware systems commands funds are within single conveyance, via a 
normal path for appropriations.  The PEO exercises control of designated resources 
within the hardware systems command’s allocation.  For purposes of this thesis, the Navy 
ACAT I programs will be examined from the PM’s perspective.  
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b. Life Cycle Costs (LCC) 
The LCC estimate plays a key role in the management of an acquisition 
program.  At each milestone decision point, including the decision to start a program, 
life-cycle costs, cost, performance, and schedule tradeoffs, cost drivers and affordability 
constraints are major considerations.  Its primary purposes include providing input to 
acquisition decisions among competing major system alternatives. LCC helps determine 
requirements.  Cost Drivers are identified among alternatives.  LCC also provide an index 
of merit for trade-off evaluations in design, logistics and manufacturing and the basis for 
overall cost control. 
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
In terms of "what to buy," DOD's efforts have focused on greater reliance on 
commercial products and processes and more timely infusion of new technology into new 
or existing systems.   COTS usage is implemented with an understanding of the complex 
set of impacts that stem from use of commercial products25.  Solicitation requirements are 
being described in performance terms.  If military specifications are necessary, waivers 
must first be obtained.  Solicitations for new acquisitions that cite military specifications 
typically encourage offerors to propose alternatives.26  DOD has made significant 
progress in disposing of the huge inventory of military specifications and standards 
through cancellation, consolidation, conversion to a guidance handbook, or replacement 
with a performance specification or non-government standard.  The Defense Acquisition 
Corps has increased education and training requirements for key positions such as those 
found in the Critical Acquisition Position (CAP).  CAPs are the most senior positions in 
the defense acquisition workforce, including program executive offices, program 
managers, deputy program managers of MDAP ACAT I defense acquisition programs 
and the program managers of significant non-MDAP ACAT programs27. 
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Maximizing the PM’s and contractor’s flexibility to make cost/performance 
tradeoffs without unnecessary higher-level permission is essential to achieving cost 
objectives.  Therefore, the number of threshold items in requirements documents and 
acquisition program baselines is strictly limited.  This thesis examines the impact of 
weapons procurement reform at the program manager’s level.  The Navy’s MDAP list 
includes DDG 51 and LPD 17 among others.  These two ACAT I MDAPs are examined 
to determine if procurement reform has helped or hindered ongoing reform initiatives.  





III. PERENNIAL ISSUES IN NAVY WEAPONS PROCUREMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter covers basic budgeting and funding authority pertaining to weapons 
procurement.  It begins with a review of budget authority, total obligational authority and 
outlays, DOD-wide and Navy-specific, from 1988 to 2000.  There will be specific 
background information related to procurement, research and development, and operation 
and maintenance dollars.  A top-level look at DOD weapons procurement is undertaken.  
Perennial issues are discussed and are incorporated in Chapters IV and V as a relevance 
test for program management techniques.   
 
Budget Authority (BA) is the authority to incur legally binding obligations on the 
government that result in immediate or future outlays.  Congress provides BA in the form 
of enacted appropriations. Total Obligational Authority (TOA) is a DOD financial term 
that expresses the value of the direct defense program for a fiscal year.  Figure 2 shows 
TOA by service in constant FY03 dollars.  The chart shows TOA decreasing from FY88 
to FY94 where it leveled off until FY99 where it increased slightly.  TOA differs from 
BA for several reasons, including BA lapsing before obligations were incurred; proposed 
or enacted legislation transferring unobligated balances for which the purpose of the 
balances has changed; reappropriations; rescissions; Net Offsetting Receipts, which are 
collections from the public.  Figure 3 shows Navy Operations & Maintenance (OMN) 
and Procurement dollars in constant FY03 dollars.  OMN and procurement dollars 
trended downward from FY88 to FY94, with a few spikes upward in FY95 and FY98.  
The gap in OMN and procurement funding increased significantly after FY92 and 
widened further until FY98 when procurement dollars were added back at a larger rate 
than OMN.  The OMN and procurement log equivalent lines show a steady decline in 
operations and maintenance and procurement funding over the past 14 years.  Data for 
figures 1, 2 and 3 were derived from the FY03 National Defense Budget Tables. 
19
































Figure 2.   DOD TOA by Service in Constant FY03$K 






























Figure 3.   Navy O&M and Procurement Outlays in Constant FY03$M 
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Net off-setting receipts are deducted from BA but have no effect on TOA.  
Outlays or expenditures are the liquidation of the government’s obligation, generally 
representing cash payments.28  Before the amended FY89 budget submission, prior year 
unobligated balances were reflected as adjustments against TOA in the applicable 
program year only.  However, since then, both the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) score such rescissions as reductions to the 
current year BA.  Previously, reappropriations were scored as new budget authority in the 
year of legislation.  However, in presenting the amended FY89 budget, CBO and OMB 
directed scoring of reappropriations as budget authority in the first year of availability.29   
 
Figure 4 shows procurement decreased from FY88 to FY96, remaining relatively 
flat for three years while O&M costs increased to support older ships and aircraft in 
FY96 to FY99.  There was some recovery of procurement and funding in FY00, but the 
gap in OMN and procurement remained steady.  The executive and legislative branches, 
special interest groups, Department of Defense, Department of the Navy and program 
managers are linked to the means of acquiring defense weapons.  Specific attention is 
placed on the actions and responses of program managers to their external, political and 
fiscal environment.  Figure 5 shows the components of DOD TOA and how it changed 
from 1988 to 2003.  Figure 5 also shows OMN and procurement as a percentage of TOA.  
Here OMN is seen as roughly flat as a percentage of TOA and procurement declining 
from the low 30th percentile in 1988 to just below the 20th percentile in 1994 before 
rebounding.  The percentage TOA shows consistency of historical share but provides no 
information as to whether this is enough or too little funding. 
21































































Constant FY 2003 Dollars
FY 2003 
$108B
Constant FY 2003 Dollars
DON TOA - Then and Now














Figure 5.   DON TOA – Then and Now 
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B. PERENNIAL ISSUES IN WEAPONS PROCUREMENT 
 
1. The President’s Budget 
The president’s budget is submitted to Congress each February.  Because of the 
prior planning and programming involved during the PPBS process, the final budget 
submission has few surprises.  Congress uses the budget as a baseline to address the 
country’s and its constituents’ needs.  The budget is debated and modified before the 
final reconciliation is done, starting a new fiscal year.  The FY03 budget proposed an 
additional $48 billion for defense, representing a 13 percent increase in constant dollars– 
the fastest growth since the defense build-up of the 1980’s30.  Defense outlays 
approached 3.5 percent of GDP in FY03, the highest levels since 1995.  (During the 
1980s, defense spending averaged nearly 6 percent of GDP.)  Included in that request was 
$10 billion designated as “wartime contingency” for combating terrorism in Afghanistan 
or other, as-yet-to-be-determined locations; that amount will not be requested for later 
years.  Members of Congress made their thoughts clear that the President’s proposed 
$48B defense spending increase provided insufficient funds for defense.  After 2003, the 
President’s budget envisions a much slower growth in budget authority for defense – for 
an average annual rate of 3.2 percent through 201231. 
 
2. Congressional and Industry Testimony on Defense Programs 
Concerns over the President’s defense procurement spending plan, coupled with 
earlier defense spending cuts from stratospheric levels of the Cold War, drew concerns 
from industry groups, including Former Assistant Navy Secretary John Douglass, 
president of the Aerospace Industries Association; retired Air Force LTGEN Larry D. 
Farrell, president of the National Defense Industries Association; and former 
Congressman Dave McCurdy, president of the Electronic Industries Alliance.  
 
Douglass, the former assistant Navy secretary, "You can't maintain a defense base 
on five ships a year."  Douglass and Farrell rolled out figures on what they see as a 
disappearing defense industrial base.  The lobbyists’ concerns were based on projected 
23
build rate of five ships per year.  They said that the nation needs a viable defense industry 
in time of war, pointing to the reduced number of makers of major defense platforms.  To 
combat the decline in ship building and maintain a force of 310 ships, the Navy must 
build an average of nine ships per year.  Proposed increased recapitulation rates are 
shown in figure six.  The “\” found in the President’s Budget (PB) column represent the 
number of ships proposed in the president’s budget.  DOD’s proposed figure found is in 
the column labeled “now” for each program.  
 
The Shipbuilding Association wanted Congress to add $935 million to the budget 
to procure a third DDG-51 in FY '03 and fund advance procurement for a third DDG-51 
in FY '04.  Such an increase would "move the Navy closer" to the requirement that it 
procure four DDG-51s a year, the rate needed to sustain a fleet of 116 destroyers and 
other surface combatants, the association wrote in an issue paper.  A third DDG 51 was 
added to the FY03 budget. 
 FY 03 FY 08FY 09
PB PB Now PB Now PB Now PB Now Now Now
CVNX - - - - - - - 1 - -
SSN 774 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
DDG 51 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 - - -
DDX - - - 1 - - 1 2 3
LCS - - - - - - - 2
LPD 17 1 1 1 1 - 1 2 1 2 2 -
LHA ( R ) - - - - - - - - 1 -
JCC - - - - - 1 - 2 - -
MPF(F) (NDSF) - - - - - - - 1 - 1 1
T-AKE (NDSF) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 - -
T-AOE (X) (NDSF) - - - - - - - - - - 2
SSGN 2 2 2 - - - - - - - -
Cruiser Conversion - 1 1 2 2 4 3 4 3 3 3
T-AGS - - - - - 1 - - - -
Total Conversions 2 3 3 2 2 5 3 4 3 3 3
CVN RCOH - - - 1 1 - - - - - -
SSN/SSBN refueling 1 2 - 1 2 3 2 4 3 2 1
LCU ( R ) - - - 5 3 5 3 5 3 3 3
LCAC SLEP 3 4 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07
Shipbuilding Programs
















Figure 6.   Recapitalization Rate for Shipbuilding Programs 
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Consolidations, mergers, and bankruptcies have limited the number of major 
weapons systems contractors.  Contractors making Navy surface ships shrank from eight 
to three from 1990 to 2000, as did the number of companies producing fixed-wing 
military shrank from eight to three aircraft.32  There still are two makers of submarines, 
though that is because Northrop won a bidding contest with General Dynamics 
Corporation.  Rotorcraft makers (such as helicopters and the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor 
airplane) declined from four to three, while makers of strategic missiles contracted from 
three to two.33   
 
The number of companies filling contracts in the undersea warfare area fell by 
two-thirds, from fifteen to five, while producers of torpedoes slipped from three to two.  
Douglass and Farrell estimated that "shipyards are operating at 50 percent of capacity," 
which is inefficient, and costs the Navy "hundreds of millions of dollars annually," 
compared to costs of operating shipyards at higher, more efficient output levels.   
 
Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), a member of the House Appropriations Defense 
subcommittee, charged that the administration's budget fell short of what several studies 
have shown is needed to make up for years of under-funding procurement. The most 
conservative analysis, which was done by the Congressional Budget Office recently, 
found that procurement should rise to at least $94 billion. 34 "The Defense Department 
procurement budget is in crisis," Dicks wrote in a recent paper on his proposal.  The 
Congressman said procurement levels are not only inadequate to sustain the force 
structure but are driving up operation and maintenance costs because aging weapon 
systems are not being replaced quickly enough.35  For instance, he said the Navy's aging 
F-14 Tomcats experienced a 227 percent increase in maintenance hours per flying hour 
from 1992 to 1999.36  Aging equipment, increased equipment complexity and quality of 
life issues have driven increased O&M spending.  Figures 4, 5 and 7 show recent O&M 
spending trends.  Figure 7 shows the President’s Budget (PB) figures lag the actual 
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Figure 7.   O&M Spending Per Capita Continues to Grow 
  
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that the low rate [of ship production] is not a 
problem in the near term [due to] the relatively young age of the fleet, which averages 16 
years.37  The expected average ship age will increase under the current procurement rate, 
as shown in figure 8.  Mr. Rumsfeld’s testimony supports the President’s budget however 
the trend is toward supporting an aging defense force.  Congressional testimonials for 
recapitulation are directed towards reducing an aging fleet that directly affects O&M 
costs.  The Navy had to make choices in its budget and fully fund spare parts, munitions 
and steaming hours, as well as adding capability with the SSGN conversions, he said.  
The Future Years Defense Plan calls for a build rate of five ships in FY04, seven in 
FY05, seven in FY06 and ten in FY07, according to a statement by Rumsfeld.   
 
Rumsfeld also said that contractor problem and more realistic weapons cost 
estimates by DOD contributed to the low ship request in FY03.  The military services 
traditionally have underestimated contract costs, Rumsfeld said.  In FY03, the Navy is 
paying $600 million for past shipbuilding bills were not paid because of the 
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underestimating of costs, he said.  Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) told Mr. Rumsfeld "I don't 
quite buy your argument" and said that the problem was not enough contracts and not 
enough money for shipbuilders.  Taylor told Rumsfeld that no company would try to 
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Figure 8.   Expected Average Ship Age 
 
3. Rising Operation and Maintenance Costs39 
According to the GAO, DOD's 2001 Future Years Defense Plan consistently 
understates cost and overstates savings projections for operations and maintenance.40  
Planned spending increases for procurement may be used to pay for operations and 
maintenance funding shortfalls.41  For example, there is a gap between the Army's stated 
requirements and DOD's planned missile procurements for the Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3 missile.  Detailed analyses of the costs, benefits, or available alternatives for 
defending U. S. forces and assets are lacking.42  Such analyses are needed to allow 
decision-makers in the Department and the Congress to make better decisions on the 
number of missiles to buy.  Similar issues regarding the vulnerability of surface ships 
may not be reflected in the budget for ship self-defense programs.  Threat drives the 
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budget.  Weapons procurement funding for FY97-FY02 was relatively flat (fluctuating 
between $719 million and $1 billion) until the War on Terror began.  Figure 9 shows an 
increase in procurement dollars after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  
Procurement increased but its percentage of overall defense spending decreased and 
weapons research and development funding declined from $517 million to $218 

































Figure 9.   Resource Distribution (Constant Year $M) 
 
According to OMB, the Navy’s active ship depot maintenance budget supports 
95.5 percent of the notional O&M requirement and 100 percent of the SCN refueling 
overhaul requirement in FY03.  There is evidence that OMB’s statement is optimistic and 
does not accurately reflect the fleet’s state of readiness.  With the decline of battle force 
ships, maintaining current OPTEMPO on an aging force averaging 16 years in FY02 is 
realized by increasing depot maintenance requirements.44  In 1993, the Navy had 108 
ships forward deployed or 24 percent of its 458-ship battle force.  In 2003, the Navy 
projects 87 of its 308 ships will be deployed or 28 percent of the battle force.45  This high 
utilization, along with aging assets, results in depot maintenance availabilities that 
increasingly exceed notional costs.46  Reductions in operations and maintenance and 
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military personnel appropriations are necessary to generate the infrastructure savings 
required to fund modernization efforts.47   
 
4. Congressional/Industry Lobbying:  Increased Procurement Funds 
Necessary 
Navy VADM Michael Mullen, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for 
Resources, Requirements and Assessments, testified before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that he agreed with a recent assessment by ADM Vern Clark, CNO that the 
Navy needs $12B more a year to procure its aircraft, ships and other major weapons 
systems48.  ADM Clark acknowledged the Navy must make a $12 billion a year 
commitment in the shipbuilding business to have an adequate Navy in the future.  “We 
can’t undo what has happened over the course of years in under-funding acquisition 
accounts,” Clark said, agreeing that procurement accounts must grow over the course of 
the FYDP.  “We must buy more ships and aircraft to meet the needs of tomorrow’s 
Navy,” he said.  Figure 10 shows the average age of Navy aircraft increasing.  Years of 






































Figure 10.   Average Aircraft Age (DON) 
 
The Joint Strike Fighter competes for each service’s dollars.  Its funding comes 
from each service’s budget, thereby shifting scarce funding to support its development 
and delivery.  Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England told the Senate Armed Services 
Committee the Navy is ensuring it adequately funds future joint aircraft programs.  The 
Navy provided $1.7 billion to the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) when it 
could have bought other aircraft like F/A-18s or more ships.  JSF is on target and will 
make a “dramatic difference” in the future war-fighting force49.   
 
The Navy’s shipbuilding program is aging too.  Representative Jo Anne Davis (R-
VA) said slipping the CVN(X) future carrier procurement by one year and turning the 
DD-21 acquisition program into a DD(X) research and development program may 
[mean] a “huge dip” in the future work force at Northrop Grumman’s Newport News 
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Shipbuilding.  “Right now, they’re having problems with their work force,” she said, 
adding that it is difficult to hire specialized shipyard workers again once they are let go.  
Congressman Rob Simmons (R-CONN.) said that laid off workers at General Dynamics’ 
(GD) Electric Boat submarine facility often require at least two years to get their security 
clearances back once they are rehired50. 
 
Congressman Reed, whose state is home to GD’s Electric Boat facility, said that 
buying one attack submarine a year will not be adequate to sustain the fleet of 55 attack 
submarines called for in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. An attack submarine’s 
life is about 30 years.  Reed said the procurement rate of two attack submarines has been 
proposed for years but keeps getting put off due to budget constraints.  He warned that 
further delays in increasing the rate would create a deeper procurement shortfall that will 
be even harder to overcome.  The shipbuilding association proposed adding $415 million 
to the Administration’s budget to fund advance procurement that would allow the Navy 
to reach a procurement rate of two attack submarines a year in FY05.   
 
a. FYDP Funding Bow Wave 
Many opportunities to reduce and streamline DOD infrastructure could 
generate savings to modernize weapon systems, reduce the deficit, and address long-
standing DOD financial management problems51.  DOD officials have repeatedly 
recognized the importance of using resources for the highest priority operations and 
investment needs.  Infrastructure reductions are a difficult and painful process because 
achieving significant cost savings requires up-front investments, closure of installations, 
and the elimination of military and civilian jobs.  Promised infrastructure savings have 
not materialized, however.  The 1988, 1991, and 1993 base realignment and closure 
(BRAC) rounds produced decisions to fully or partially close 70 major domestic bases 
and resulted in a 15-percent reduction in plant replacement value.  Between FY96 and 
FY01, no significant savings resulted from infrastructure reforms because the proportion 
of infrastructure spending in DOD budgets remained constant.52  The 1995 BRAC was 
supposed to reduce the overall domestic base structure by a minimum of another 15 
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percent, for a total 30-percent reduction in DOD-wide plant replacement value.  
However, the 1995 closures and realignments only increased the total reduction to 
approximately 21 percent, or 9 percent short of DOD's goal53.   
 
The rise and fall of DOD’s procurement spending follows the movement 
of the total budget.  As DOD reduced programmed procurement in successive FYDPs, it 
has reprogrammed some procurement to the years beyond the FYDP to create a bow 
wave of demand for procurement funds.  Optimistic planning provides an unclear picture 
of defense priorities because tough decisions and trade-offs is avoided.54  Figure 11 
shows that a large investment increase is required to make up for deferred funding.  The 
challenge for senior DOD officials and program managers is how best to maximize 
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Figure 11.   Estimates Indicate Large Investment Increase Required 
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b. Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Begun Too Soon55 
PMs proceed with low-rate initial production (LRIP) without sufficiently 
demonstrating that a weapon system works as designed.  DOD still begins full-rate 
production of major and secondary weapons without first ensuring that the systems will 
meet critical performance requirements.  For example, the F-22 aircraft program involves 
considerable technical risk because it embodies technological advances that are critical to 
its operational success.  Nevertheless, DOD began production of the F-22 aircraft well 
before beginning initial operational testing and committed 70 aircraft at a cost of $14 
billion before initial operational testing was completed56.   
 
GAO reported that DOD's policy to begin low-rate initial production of 
weapons without doing any (or little) operational testing and evaluation (OTE) resulted in 
procurement of substantial quantities of unsatisfactory weapons57.  OTE is the primary 
means of assessing weapon system performance in a combat-representative environment.  
It is defined as the field test, conducted under realistic conditions, to determine an item’s 
effectiveness and suitability for use in combat by typical military users and the evaluation 
of the results of such test.  The options available to DOD and Congress are significantly 
limited when a system proves deficient.  Used effectively, OTE can be a key internal 
control to ensure that decision-makers have objective information available on a weapon 
system’s performance.58  The decision to proceed with production should be made at the 
start of OTE because, in many cases, LRIP is also the de facto full-rate production 
decision59.  
 
c. Insufficient Operational Test and Evaluation60 
Program managers begin production of weapon systems before 
development and operational testing, and evaluation (OTE) is complete.  When this 
strategy is used, critical decisions are made without adequate information about a 
weapon's demonstrated operational effectiveness, reliability, logistics supportability, and 
readiness for production.  Rushing into production before critical tests have been 
successfully completed results in purchased weapon systems that do not perform as 
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intended.  Premature purchases have resulted in lower-than-expected availability for 
operations and maintenance and have often led to expensive modifications.  
 
d. Overestimated Funding 
DOD’s prevailing culture continually generates and supports acquisition 
of new weapons.  It is usual for incentives and special interests to override the need to 
satisfy the most critical weapon requirements at minimal cost.  A Program manager’s 
tendency to overestimate future funding coupled with the tendency to underestimate 
program costs, have resulted in the advent of more programs than can be executed.  There 
is an increased cost of doing business despite shrinking budgets.  Program managers 
often have to reduce, delay and stretch out programs, substantially increasing the 
lifecycle cost of each system.  In addition to the higher unit costs caused by program 
stretch-outs, another downside to the affordability issue is DOD’s inability to address 
valid requirements when available resources are consumed on questionable priorities61. 
 
e. Unreasonable Assumptions 
DOD has a compelling need to accelerate the weapon systems acquisition 
cycle and reduce average unit costs.  DOD Inspector General reported that a significant 
gap exists between weapon systems modernization requirements and planned funding.  
DOD has a goal to increase procurement spending by recapitalizing about $10 billion 
dollars a year by shifting funds from other discretionary areas.  The Inspector General 
(IG) doubts that planned actions will free up that amount of funds62.  Program sponsors 
have used unreasonable assumptions about the pace and magnitude of the technical 
effort, material costs, production rates and savings from competition to keep cost 
estimates as low as possible and present attractive milestone schedules.    
The fact that a given weapon system costs more than estimated, takes 
longer to field and does not perform as promised is secondary to fielding a new system63.  
DOD continues to pursue a number of major defense acquisition programs on the 
assumption that savings will materialize. Weapons procurement is based on optimistic 
assumptions about the maturity and availability of enabling technologies.   
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DOD's programmed spending plans cannot be executed with available 
funds64.  Numerous problems exist with DOD's budgeting and spending practices for 
weapon system acquisitions, suggesting that wants and needs are not being balanced with 
affordability limitations.  For example, the availability of several billions of dollars in 
funding increases that the Air Force has projected for space system expansion is 
uncertain.65  Figure 12 shows the average age of its aircraft, demonstrating a need for 
increased procurement funding or using savings projections to fund new systems.  The 
President and the Congress have not agreed on overall funding increases to DOD for the 
first 6 years of the 18-year projection (FY00-FY05).  Additionally, for the last 12 years of 
the projection (FY06- FY17), the Air Force relies on planned funding increases for 
program modernization without identifying funding sources, thus creating additional 
uncertainty and putting the expansion of space systems in jeopardy for affordability 
reasons.  Current procurement spending might be reduced to fund potential operations 
and maintenance shortfalls.   
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Figure 12.   USAF Average Age of Aircraft Increasing 
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f. Systems Do Not Match Requirements66 
Some weapon systems are being developed and produced, even though the 
Soviet threat upon which they were justified has diminished.  Pervasive problems persist 
regarding questionable requirements and solutions that are not the most cost-effective 
available and involve unrealistic cost, schedule and performance estimates; and 
questionable program affordability67.  Acquisition of new weapon systems that do not 
satisfy the most critical weapon requirements at minimal cost and commit more 
procurement funds to programs than can reasonably be expected to be available in future 
defense budgets remain despite efforts to reform defense procurement.68  Many new 
weapon systems cost more than their predecessor and do less than anticipated.  Delivery 
schedules delays are common.  Figure 13 shows that the average cost of weapon 
replacement rising. 
 
Fielded and Replacement 
System Cost Comparison
*Average Procurement Unit Cost in Constant Year 2000 $M
Fielded System 
Unit Cost*
F-15C 45.2 F-22 99.8 124.0
SSN 688 845.0 SSN 774 1,615.1 1,620.0
A/V-8B 29.9 JSF 51.6 70.0
OH-58D 9.8 RAH-66 23.3 27.5
Bottom Line:  New systems are costing significantly 
more than the systems they are replacing
Replacement System 
Unit Cost*
Service Est CAIG Est
 
Figure 13.   Fielded and Replacement System Cost Comparison 
 
DOD's prevailing culture continually generates and supports acquisition of 
new weapons.  Inherent in this culture are powerful incentives and interests that influence 
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and motivate the behaviors of participants in the process, including DOD components, 
Congress, and industry.69  It is not unusual for incentives and special interests to override 
the need to satisfy the most critical weapon requirements at minimal cost.  The Air 
Force’s C-17 aircraft continued production after analysis showed that if the C-17 program 
were stopped at 40 aircraft, 64 commercial wide-body aircraft would have to be added to 
the existing airlift fleet for an estimated life-cycle savings of $6B when compared with a 
fleet of 120 C-17 aircraft.  The Air Force acknowledged there were considerably cheaper 
alternatives to meet airlift requirements than full production of C-17s but delayed making 
a decision and launched a new study to determine an optimal mix of aircraft to meet 
airlift requirements.70  C-17 continued production despite gross schedule delays, 
performance shortfalls (wings, flaps and slats) and cost overruns that were due, in part, to 
Congressional political pressure.    
 
g. Alternative Weaponry Should Be Considered 
Cultural resistance to change, service parochialism, and public and 
congressional concern with the economic effects of reduced or cancelled weapons 
contribute to reluctance to cut programs that may no longer be effective.  Program 
managers press for continued support of their program whether or not it meets the needs 
of the nation.  There are several points supporting the need for deeper research before 
accepting new weapons programs.  The AOA is provided to help determine if the weapon 
system is needed.  The Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is an analysis of the proposed 
system’s operational effectiveness related to its life-cycle costs compared to various other 
alternatives to meet the mission area need.  Although the military services conduct 
considerable analyses in justifying major acquisitions can be narrowly focused and may 
not fully consider alternative solutions.   
 
The PM provides analysis, valuable advice and counsel, particularly 
regarding the executability of proposed alternatives.71  Research and technology efforts 
are not disassociated from weapon programs until they reach the program definition and 
risk-reduction phase.  Historically, the services analyses do not include joint acquisition 
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of systems with other systems.72  Previous failed attempts at joint weapons development 
like the TFX Fighter were due to parochialism, cultural biases and inaccurate 
requirements determination.73  Since then, JSF has proven to be a beginning in successful 
joint acquisition.  Because DOD does not routinely develop information on joint mission 
needs and aggregate capabilities, it has little assurance that its decisions to buy, modify or 
retire systems are sound.   
 
C. OUTDATED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS74 
 
Defense outlays have produced many of the world’s most capable weapon 
systems.  Yet its contract administration system has proven costly and inefficient.  It 
continues to rely on a far-flung, complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, 
acquisition, and other management information systems - 80 percent of which are not 
under the control of the DOD Comptroller - to gather the financial data needed to support 
the day-to-day management decision making.  The Government Performance and Results 
Act (GPRA) and the Chief Financial Officer’s Act have not proven very effective in 
forcing departmental procurement reform.   
 
Many of the department’s business operations are mired in old, inefficient 
processes and legacy systems, some of which go back to the 1950s and 1960s.  The 
department still relies on the Mechanization of Contract Administration Services 
(MOCAS) system – which dates back to 1968.  This network was not designed, but rather 
has evolved into an overly complex and error- prone operation that exists today, 
including little standardization across DOD components; multiple systems performing the 
same tasks; duplicate data stored in multiple systems; manual data entry into multiple 
systems, and a large number of data translations and interfaces that combine to 
exacerbate problems with data integrity.   
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Standard Procurement System (SPS) was intended to replace the contract 
administration functions currently performed by MOCAS.  GAO reported that the 
department had not economically justified its investment in SPS because its latest 
(January 2000) analysis of costs and benefits was not credible.75  Although the 
department committed to fully implementing SPS by March 31, 2000, this target date had 
slipped by over 3 ½ years to September 30, 2003, and program officials have recently 
stated that this date will not be met76.   
 
DOD’s financial systems could not adequately track and report whether $1.1 
billion in earmarked funds that the Congress provided to DOD for spare parts and 
associated logistical support were actually used for its intended purpose.77  The vast 
majority of the funds -92 percent - was transferred to the military services operation and 
maintenance accounts (O&M).  Once the funds were transferred into O&M accounts, the 
department could not separately track the use of the funds.  As a result, DOD lost its 
ability to assure the Congress that the funds it received for spare parts purchases were 
used for that purpose.  Problems with the department’s financial management operations 
go far beyond its accounting and finance systems and processes.  Wasteful contract 
administration practices add billions of dollars to defense acquisition costs.  
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
Each year, the President submits his budget.  Defense traditionally gets the largest 
percent of discretionary funding.  Threats, perceived or actual, to national security drive 
the amount of defense funding received in any fiscal year.  Congress, industry experts 
and the nation debate its merits and jockey to receive limited resources.  Congress 
expects DOD to provide quality products that meet the war-fighter's needs and allow for 
substantial cost reductions, have better program stability, have shorter program cycle 
times, and use innovative design, manufacturing, support, and contracting approaches.  
Program managers promote and garner funding for programs.  Congress and DOD 
provide tools to assist its components in weapons procurement.  Given the current state of 
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shrinking budgets and diverse, non-traditional threats, appropriate use of commercially 
available products is one remedy that might enable the Navy to acquire needed 
capabilities in a cost effective manner. 
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Chapters II and III provided background information on legislative, regulatory, 
and procedural changes affecting defense acquisition over the last 10 years.  The defense 
contracting scandals of the 1980s led to tighter regulations, and the expansion of criminal 
and civil penalties. This sparked the reforms of the 1990s, which loosened regulations in 
procurement.  At the same time, dollars available for defense procurement declined.  
Chapter III data show the trend toward decreased procurement funding and higher O&M 
expenditures.  This chapter explores techniques employed by major defense acquisition 
program managers to manage their programs in today’s fiscally constrained environment.  
There is less quantitative data in this chapter and instead, there is a great deal more 
qualitative analysis.  This chapter’s qualitative analysis builds on the substantive data in 
Chapter III and applies defense reform initiatives to the day-to-day actions of acquisition 
leaders to help determine if procurement reform helped manage critical dollars.   
 
Interviews of five former program managers (PM) were performed to determine 
the relevance of procurement reform from their perspective.  Their responses were as 
varied as their programs.  Their candid comments reflected their component’s culture and 
influence in programmatic decision-making.  Their responses were captured in nine areas 
covered under the Program Management Techniques section.  ACAT I program 
managers’ techniques in an ever-changing threat environment are revealed.  PMs interact 
with the user and Congress to make the best system possible.  Caps on new discretionary 
budget authority and on outlays increasingly constrain defense spending.  It is important 
that congressional decision-makers have accurate estimates of program outlays78.  More 
accurate projections provide greater confidence that program funding will be within 
overall discretionary limits without restricting spending further than necessary79.  The 
techniques employed by the program managers are a result of laws, administrative 
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procedures and federal regulations; they also result from Congressional and DOD cultural 
influences, and personal style.  They may be seen as thematic responses, but in each case, 
it was clear that the PM’s decision reflected his biases and interpretation of regulations. 
 
1. Establishing the Process 
The defense acquisition process is based on a disciplined approach for integrating 
the efforts and products of three major decision support systems:  the requirements 
generation system, the acquisition management system and the Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting System (PPBS).80  The requirements generation system is responsible for 
identifying and documenting operational mission needs for fixing shortcomings in 
existing systems or for adding new operational capabilities.  The acquisition management 
system translates the user’s needs into an operational system.  This process provides the 
basis for making informed tradeoff decisions based on affordability constraints and user 
needs.  The PPBS system provides the means for planning the funding for the research, 
development, test and evaluation (RDTE), procurement, fielding, and maintaining of a 
new or modified weapon system.  It is the integration of these three support systems that 
has caused a lot of the problems found in the acquisition process.81  The disciplined 
approach to the entire acquisition process is based on the integration of the requirements, 
acquisition management and the PPBS to a set of milestone decisions and acquisition 
phases.82  Conceivably, a system could meet requirements, but fail to operate properly, or 
it may be too expensive without superior acquisition management.  As the lead 
procurement official for his program, the program manager is charged with balancing 
these challenges.   
 
The acquisition process for a major defense acquisition program is the most 
complicated and has the highest level of oversight for DOD weapons procurement.83  The 
ACAT I program manager has to meet even stricter qualification and requirements than 
non-ACAT I program managers.  Figure 14 shows the current requirements to become an 
ACAT I program manager.  The training and experience requirements are designed to 
select program managers with a broad base of program office experience.  An 
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inexperienced PM could have adverse effects on the program’s life.  Finally, without 
proper PPBS planning, a weapon system could be designed and tested and still fall short 
of expectations if it does not have the funding support to field it84.  Together, they lay 




Figure 14.   Assignment Requirements for ACAT I Program Managers 
 
The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) is constructed at each service’s 
headquarters.  The Navy’s service headquarters is the Chief of Naval Operations Staff 
(OPNAV).  The service component acquisition executives (CAE) compile and review 
requirements for defense procurement funds before the POM is forwarded to Congress.  
The military services want more money than they can conceivably get from Congress and 
the Pentagon wants more money than the President’s budget allows85.  The Senate or 
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House member wants more for their district than is budgeted86.  This results in political 
maneuvering and old-fashioned politicking.   
 
Acquisition programs establish an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), which is 
an agreement between the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) and PM to document the 
cost, schedule, and performance objectives and thresholds of that program beginning at 
program initiation.  The APB contains the most important cost, schedule and performance 
parameters and is updated as required.  Maximizing the PM’s flexibility to make cost, 
performance and schedule tradeoffs without unnecessary higher-level permission is 
essential to achieving programmatic objectives.  A more complete discussion of cost, 
schedule and performance criteria follows later in the chapter.  An ACAT designation is 
normally assigned after approval of the operational requirements document (ORD).  A 
proposed ACAT designation is provided on the cover of the requirements document.  The 
criteria for ACAT I programs were discussed in Chapter II.  (MDAP and ACAT I are 
used interchangeably in this thesis.) 
 
The user identifies an operational need that cannot be satisfied by nonmaterial 
solutions and produces a Mission Need Statement (MNS).  Once the MNS is approved by 
the Service Chief of Staff and validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC), the USD (A&T) convenes the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).  The DAB is 
the Department’s senior level forum for advising USD (A&T) on critical decisions 
concerning ACAT ID programs.  The MDA is the USD (A&T) for ACAT ID programs 
where the “D” stands for defense.  The MDA is the service component for ACAT IC 
programs, where the “C” stands for component.  The Navy’s MDA is the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition).  The DAB is comprised 
of the Department’s senior acquisition officials.  The DAB reviews the mission needs 
statement (MNS) and makes recommendations to the Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA), for concept studies of a minimum set of alternative.  This review and MDA 
approval constitutes the Milestone 0 decision, concept studies and approval, and directs 
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the initiation of Phase 0, concept exploration and definition, with an acquisition decision 
memorandum (ADM). 
 
2. OMN Funding (Revisited)  
Because O&M costs are central to understanding the drivers behind programmatic 
techniques, they will be discussed from a program manager’s perspective.  OMN funds 
can be used to make up for funding shortfalls because they can be switched to other 
programs.  The services have some flexibility as to how they use their O&M funds, 
which is evident from the O&M obligation patterns87.  In the 1990’s, the amount of O&M 
funds increased at a faster rate than procurement and RDT&E funding.  The service’s 
annual O&M budget requests to Congress are presented in four broad categories referred 
to as budget activities: operating forces, mobilization, training and recruiting and 
administrative and service-wide activities88.  Each budget activity is further broken down 
into activity groups that, in turn, are broken down into sub-activity groups.  The sub-
activity groups are further broken down into program element codes.  Program element 
codes are not part of the formal presentation to Congress; but they provide more details 
on how the services plan to expend appropriated funds.89 
 
Because the services do not allocate appropriated funds to the program element 
level, Congress and the services’ headquarters do not have complete visibility over the 
amounts appropriated, and obligated.90  There is even less input and tracking of O&M 
spending. Congress and the services have even less visibility once funds are allocated to 
the program manager.  Program managers prefer less visibility because too much detail 
would hamper their ability to move funds without higher level authority oversight.  The 
comptroller disagrees with the program manager and prefers stricter accounting of O&M 
funds because it makes their job easier.  Army and Navy program managers generally 
believe that restricting the use of O&M funds could limit their ability to transfer between 
various weapons systems budget accounts, and specifically limits their ability to adjust to 
changing threats or adapting to budget cuts.91 
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 PMs are not held responsible for total O&M costs in the way they are held 
responsible for proper use of RDTE and procurement funds.  Because operation and 
maintenance dollars are more easily tailored to changing funding demands than other 
colors of money, they are used to make up for funding shortfalls.  The PM’s use of 
different colors of money also helps with programmatic cuts.  RDTE is more difficult to 
cut than procurement dollars.  Production dollars used for in-service engineering can be 
cut.  If the PM needs more travel funds, he can switch funding internally.  Hardware 
system commands (HSC), like NAVSEA, have to worry about travel limitations on 
spending, but in some cases, the PM exercises more flexibility.   
 
One PM said there is little pressure for the PM to meet life cycle savings, because 
life cycle savings focused on longer-term goals.  PMs are evaluated on managing 
procurement costs instead of longer-term life-cycle costs.  Because life-cycle costs 
encompass operation and support contingencies over the long term, it is difficult to hold 
the PM accountable.  There are just too many variables related to changing political and 
social forces which make de facto accountability of long term cycle costs unrealistic for 
the PM to effectively reign in.  Effective management of procurement and to a lesser 
extent, RDTE dollar savings are appropriate metrics of an effective PM.  The PM relies 
more heavily on shrinking RDTE and procurement dollars to fill the most critical needs.  
The PM subsequently got more dependent on ever-increasing (on a percentage basis) 
operations and maintenance funds because the pool of procurement and RDTE funds 
shrank over the 1990’s.  Procurement and RDTE dollars, combined with O&M are 
critical to weapons programs sustainment.  Tension exists between the PM and hardware 
systems command (HSC) on the best means to utilize scarce procurement dollars.  The 
HSC wants the PM to use funds to procure weaponry and spare parts.  The PM’s actions 
conceivably could minimize the HSC’s need to purchase greater numbers of spares. 
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B. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 
 
1. Requirements Determination 
A good requirements-generation process provides program managers with critical 
understanding of the mission needs, planned operational environment, and potential areas 
for tradeoffs.  However, quality leadership makes or breaks a program.  Good, timely 
decisions by key decision-makers have the greatest influence on a program's final cost, 
performance and schedule.  Improvements in regulations and management training have 
made up a large portion of acquisition reform.  The latest changes have been in the areas 
of chain of command, training, increased user participation, and testing92.   
 
Authorization documents are for a stated quantity and associated dollars.  
Program Managers are restricted from spending more funds than authorized.  DOD 
earmarked $1.1B for spare parts in the 1999 Appropriations Act.  However, current 
financial information does not show the extent to which the department used these funds 
for spare parts.  DOD transferred 92 percent of these funds to the military services’ O&M 
accounts.  The remaining 8 percent was transferred to a Navy procurement account 
related to spare parts for new equipment.93  DOD lost visibility of these funds94.  Once 
the funds were transferred into the operation and maintenance accounts, the department 
did not separately track the use of these funds.  They could have been used for a variety 
of purposes, including obtaining new or repaired spare parts.95   
 
Creative funds management contributed to the lost visibility.  One creative 
technique employed by a PM to deliver spares to the end user entailed provision 
contracting.  For instance, the PM used non-purchasing contracts as part of a production 
contract to obligate funds.  She used provision contracting to have a ready supply of kits 
to support the weapon system.  Provision contracting employs an equipment specialist to 
estimate the number of items necessary to support a given system.  Next, the contracting 
officer awards a range of spare and repair parts to meet the needs of the program96.  
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Ideally that equipment specialist has a lot of experience, and operates like an independent 
assessment team.  PMs use equipment specialists in budget determination.  Weapon 
systems are complex and without the benefit of an expert to analyze cost estimates, the 
PM would be at the mercy of the contractor’s estimate.   
 
2. Pressure to Produce Weapons 
A program manager stated, “The PM is the program’s primary spokesperson and 
champion.”  ACAT I program managers commit to serving as PM until completion of the 
first major milestone or at least 4 years, which helps program stability.  A PM said, 
“Unless they achieve flag rank, follow-on tours are a let down because the level of 
power, respect and influence exercised as a program manager cannot be duplicated.”  
They regret leaving the job.  The PM can become parochial and get too attached to a 
program.  In some cases, he may feel it is his duty to see the program continue at all 
costs.  A former PM felt, “Regardless of the program’s current state, the PM can make it 
the best that he can, then leave it up to the service to decide if the program is good or 
not.”  Another PM remarked, “The PM understands that someone will slow him down.”  
He has to be honest and tell the service if the program is not functioning properly.  “If a 
program does not perform as required by the acquisition production baseline, the PM is 
supposed to be honest and recommend it be killed.  The PM has to weigh serving in 
uniform and succumbing to external pressure to the keep the program alive versus his 
career aspirations in some cases.  There is pressure of possibly moving on to a higher 
promotion if the program is successful.97”   
 
On balance, job security and promotion are not the driving issues for all PMs.  
One PM said there are civilian and military PMs and no direct correlation between 
program loyalty and integrity was indicated or examined in her experience.  Four out of 
five PMs said, that integrity was the most important consideration on how to manage the 
position.  One ACAT 1D aircraft program manager needed ground test equipment to 
improve its weapon system.  The contractor wanted $107M to test the item.  The PM felt 
it was too much money given the limited success it achieved on similar aircraft.  The PM 
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used special test equipment that proved effective and thus killed the program and saved 
the government $77M.  In this case, the equipment was ancillary to the program, but it 
shows that pressure to deliver an effective system is enormous. 
 
Congressional culture to produce weapons is due to pressure to provide results 
(jobs).  Leaner budget years have had a profound effect on the military’s culture to 
acquire weapons, but there still is external pressure applied by Congress to fund some 
weapons.  One program manager said, “bomber pilots take a back seat to the fighters 
when it comes to aircraft procurement”, in the Air Force.  Previously, military leaders 
wanted whatever was new and whatever was best.  Congressional influence rears its ugly 
head on some procurement buys.  A PM cited Congressman Newt Gingrich for pressing 
continued development of the C-17, despite a history of documented performance, 
schedule and cost problems, because it meant extra jobs in his district.  There has been 
debate over the need for the Air Force’s F-22.  The budget contributes to the culture to 
produce weapons.  In the last ten years producing weapons whether needed or not has not 
been prevalent.  The program managers interviewed thought there is a greater desire to 
produce the best weaponry for the most buck.  Contractors continue to lobby their 
hardware to PMs, Congress and other defense officials to gain interest in their products.  
Yet, requirements have gotten more refined and the days of buying extra equipment are 
over.   
 
The Sergeant York Divisional Air Defense (DIVAD) Gun is an example of a 
program that was subjected to intense political pressure from Congress and industry 
watchdogs.  The Army’s problem with DIVAD was due to building and producing it 
while it was being tested.  A proper OTE such that a greater amount of errors were 
eliminated would have prevented excessive re-engineering costs.  DIVAD is a classic 
example of how the military system keeps a weapons system alive that does not match 
need or is not capable of encountering the threat in the manner specified.98  The PM is 
supposed to recommend cancellation if it is a lemon, but that is not always the case.  
DIVAD’s program manager did not.  The PM does not have the final say on program 
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cancellation and can only recommend what course a program should take.  The PM did 
not speak up and admit the A12 was not performing as prescribed and was riddled with 
cost overruns until it was too late.  (The A12 was a firm fixed priced contract.  The use of 
the term cost overrun as defined by the program managers interviewed is considered 
acceptable in this case.).   
 
3. Pressure to Deliver Weapons 
The primary purpose of low-rate initial production (LRIP) is to produce enough 
units for operational testing and evaluation and to establish production capabilities to 
prepare for full-rate initial production.  Limiting initial production affords the opportunity 
to confirm the stability and soundness of a new system before producing larger 
quantities99.  Procurement regulations encourage proceeding with LRIP without fully 
testing new equipment.  LRIP is limited to ten percent of full rate production.  
Oftentimes, program managers are too low on funding to properly complete the 
developmental and operational testing of the systems prior to fielding.  Pressure to deliver 
early or on time exists.  This results in systems that do not meet operational needs and 
requiring expensive modifications to meet specifications.100   
 
One PM stated, “You can never fully test a system’s software, otherwise the cost 
would be too great and it would never be delivered.”  The PM takes calculated risks.  
There are always “unknown unknowns,” which have to be minimized.  He added, 
“Software is arguably the greatest unknown and the most expensive aspect of a weapon 
to correct.”  “Sure”, one PM stated, “The PM commits to LRIP while debugging 
software.  It takes about a year to go from LRIP to the production line.”  All of the PMs 
thought, that in order to stay on schedule the PM has to push for production without fully 
demonstrating that all software (and hardware) bugs has been removed.  One PM said, 
“In Desert Storm, the Javelin missiles provided were LRIP items.  Because it would take 
a year to deliver the full rate production missiles, there was no time to wait for the 
production missiles.”  Javelin performed very well during Desert Storm.   
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CENTCOM needed Javelin immediately without benefit of a full OTE.  
Delivering weapon systems ahead of schedule means that there may be physical 
differences in the tested product and the end product.  There are always post delivery 
modifications and ECPs to improve the weapon.  Realistically, there is no way to 
eliminate all costs and the pressure to deliver is too great to ignore.  Cost is the big driver 
when the schedule slips.  However, a program that does not deliver on time is 
unacceptable.  The program becomes a target for cancellation, if its delivery is delayed.  
Another challenge for the PM happens because he has to obligate funds two years in 
advance of delivery.  There are many unknown unknowns that may go wrong with such 
an early fund commitment.  Sometimes the PM does not realize his mistake until well 
into the process.  Lessons learned provide excellent feedback after a mistake is realized. 
 
The acquisition strategy for a large industrial truck was flawed because the EMD 
phase had been eliminated by the Army’s acquisition executive.  The truck was based on 
an existing Austrian design.  It was decided that because it was designed, tested and built 
previously, it was deemed a non-developmental item (NDI).  This NDI proved to be a 
completely new vehicle.  The new vehicle required an additional axle, air inflatable tires 
and twelve additional design changes.  These changes were significant enough to be a 
developmental item.  For the PM, this was a costly lesson learned totaling $8M.  NDI 
remains a relevant alternative and can be an effective tool in reducing costs, but this case 
highlights what happens when short cuts are taken for the sake of marketing the program 
to Congress.  Marking the program as NDI made it easier to sell its initial estimates.  In 
the end, this program encountered cost overruns and schedule delays because of a 
programmatic decision to label the vehicle as a non-developmental item.  Herein lies a 
flaw of aggressive program development without applying due diligence in milestone 0. 
 
4. Tension in Managing Programmatic Cuts 
Procurement leaders make trade-offs when it comes to deciding on ways to 
maximize cost objectives.  Overemphasis on one value means stinting on others.  Cost 
objectives as defined in this thesis is that amount of funds appropriated to keep the 
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weapons program operational in the near and far terms.  The PM’s best system, overall, is 
one that seamlessly blends contending goals of schedule, performance and cost.  In the 
cost, schedule and performance triangle, schedule is the greatest driver for the program 
manager.  Performance is second in order of significance with cost being the least 
significant factor for the program manager.  This conflicts with Congress’ emphasis on 
cost, which was discussed in paragraph B3 of this chapter.  Tension exists with the 
comptroller because the comptroller, by nature of his position also emphasizes cost over 
schedule.   
 
Because there are cost, schedule and performance pressures from the acquisition 
program baseline (APB), the PM ensures all involved are aware of the unknown 
unknowns involved with his particular weapons systems procurement and development.  
Cost grows during the engineering, manufacturing and development phase.  One PM said 
the PM is always under pressure to meet schedule deadlines.  Another PM said, 
“Programs are never under cost and ahead of schedule, but instead are the other way 
around.”  The need of the war fighter determines how fast an item is procured.  Spare 
parts and repair parts cost more if they are bought in the out years.  Program managers 
are increasingly faced with what/if scenarios to determine what they would do if program 
funding was cut101.  They are often called to explain the effects of programmatic cuts to 
Congressional staffers (or the PEO if the PM is not allowed to visit Congress).   
 
Programmatic cuts extend programs.  Extending a program depends to a large 
degree on the user community requirements.  The PM asks, “Does the user want the 
program completed sooner?”  He may look for other money or extend the program.  To 
extend the program longer than the projected delivery period increases costs.  Contractors 
want to extend production because it means the cost per unit increases and it allows them 
to employ people for more years.  Congressmen prefer extended programs rather than a 
shorter delivery date in their districts because it means more jobs for a longer period.  
Funding reductions are not necessarily bad for Congress and contractors as long as the 
program is allowed to survive.  Killing a program is invariably bad because that means 
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lost jobs.  Congress hates to take responsibility for killing any weapon system102.  The 
ultimate of goal of Congress, SECDEF, and the program manager is to reduce acquisition 
costs but the motivation differs, thereby increasing tension. 
 
The contractor wants the program extended for as long as possible.  There is 
tension between DOD and industry over the possibility of canceling a program.  A 
contractor may believe that due to the service’s sunk costs, a program will not be 
cancelled.  That is not so.  The service does not weigh sunk costs heavily when 
determining a program’s applicability.  Inappropriate, inaccurate and outdated weaponry 
means lost lives and misdirected resources.  If a program is no longer viable, like the 
Army’s Crusader, then it is eliminated.  One PM said, “Affected Congressmen staunchly 
defend a program whether it is still applicable or not.”  He added, “Lobbying across 
warfare systems is not universally undertaken however.  Some systems rarely are 
championed and survive nevertheless.  Consider the Navy’s mine warfare community.  
Navy mine warfare ships and weapons are perennial budget-cut fodder.”  Mine warfare is 
hardly ever championed as a POM priority item.  This particular program manager said, 
“Instead its funding stream looks like a sine wave, traveling up and down in value.  It’s 
an important program, but does not have broad appeal.  Prime contractors are just not 
lobbying Congress for additional mine warfare funding to the degree they press for other 
programs.” 
 
Another PM worked his program so he had all his budget years funded for a 
certain amount.  One day this PM was presented with a $30M cut by his PEO.  He was 
able to determine very quickly that it would mean cutting the fifth year of the program, 
effectively ending it.  Initially, the budget headquarters did not believe him because his 
response was quick and they felt he was exaggerating.  Nevertheless, the PM submitted a 
contract modification to cancel the contract’s fifth year due to lack of program funding.  
The contractor learned that the program was being cancelled and became upset over the 
cancellation determination.  Initially, the contractor thought the cancellation was due to 
non-performance, but after learning it was due to decreased funding, he told the PM that 
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he’d lobby for funding.  The contractor lobbied his Congressman to provide funding for 
an additional $30M, by fencing the funds for the program.  Congress returned the original 
$30M and the program continued.   
 
On some occasions, the PEO does not want to choose which of his programs gets 
cut, so he may use the “gold watch” approach to defend his program.  The PEO proposes 
the “gold watch” program is available to cut in hopes that no one touches it because it is a 
hot program.  This strategy could have disastrous results if the “gold watch” was marked.  
Should that fail the door is open for cuts.  Despite the program manager’s best efforts, 
funding levels are inevitably cut.  The program office plans for it.  The PEO plans for it.  
The contractor plans for it.  The challenge is to maintain a viable, cost-effective system 
that has champions to see it through to completion.   
 
5. Tension to Provide Accurate Cost Estimates 
One PM said, “The PM does not really ‘know’ what a program will cost in the out 
years, but projections are sized to the budget.”  As the program gets closer to budget 
execution, it gets better defined.  Early in a program’s life, the PM has an unallocated 
budget, but he has no real concrete data on the program until it matures.  There are no 
real work packages; instead there are budget wedges, which are an informal method of 
fleshing out all work packages until they become more realistic.  Bottom up engineering 
estimates are a good method of estimating costs for the PM.  If the program is in its 
second or third generation, extraction of actuals is used to estimate costs.  Estimates are 
on the high end because of unknown unknowns.  For instance, if the system has to change 
hardware from aluminum to titanium, it may be difficult to properly estimate the cost, 
particularly if there are no metallurgy technical experts on staff to gauge the estimated 
costs. 
 
ACAT ID cost estimates are received from the contractor and forwarded to the 
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) for review and approval.  The PM is under 
enormous pressure, particularly early in a program, to present smaller cost estimates, 
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because high costs may threaten the program.  There is a range of estimates, from most-
probable, to best-case to worst-case.  The best-case estimate is normally chosen.  Low 
initial cost estimates are an effective tool to buy into a program.  Contractors submit low 
bids specifically to get their foot in the door.  PMs realize that the costs may be too low, 
but are left with the most responsive bidder.  Before recent acquisition reforms like 
FARA and FASA, the lowest cost bidder always won, except in the case of ACAT ID 
programs, which require a more thorough analysis.   
 
The PM’s estimate is used to get Congress to accept the program.  The PM’s 
estimates are based on the largest buy and the most efficient production rate – which 
never materializes.  If Congress does not give the PM enough money then the PM 
stretches the program by procuring a lower quantity per year.  It is better to get it now 
because by the time the PM asks for it, it will cost more in the future for the same item.103  
It is more expensive in the out years to stretch a program out, but it is done to meet 
budget demands.  As he looks at the POM, the program manager may review the 
milestones and determine that because of slow or under-funding, the program may need 
to be “stretched” to keep the program viable and to get weapons to the end user.   
 
One PM said, “It comes down to schedule, performance and cost.”  Cost remains 
the primary driver for Congress.  Congress balks at higher-than-expected bids.  
Contractors network continuously, and are able to ascertain the ballpark figure and use it 
as their estimate.  PMs use their own organic estimators to get a feel of where the costs 
fall.  PMs intentionally co-opt the estimate of the hardware systems commands hiring in-
house experts.  The in-house experts provide a more favorable (lower) estimate. 
 
Subsequent cost estimates are also low to demonstrate the program’s cost 
effectiveness to Congress.  Some contractors are notorious for increasing program costs.  
Experienced contractors know that the initial commitment is vital.  Once DOD and 
Congress are on board, the contractor increases costs to make up for the initial low bid.  
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After a few years, the general and administrative costs increase and so does cost base.  
Contractors recover cost with contract modifications and engineering change proposals.  
One PM thought a particular contractor submitted bids at the most optimistic estimate 
point without due consideration for what it actually cost to win contracts.  For example, 
this contractor’s first bid for an equipment upgrade on an existing system came in at 
$1.3B, which matched the government’s estimate.  Congress balked at the bid, however 
and threatened to cancel the program, so the contractor submitted a second bid for half 
the original cost, while lobbying to keep the program going because of the low cost.  The 
contractor subsequently made up costs for the low bid through engineering change 
proposals (ECPs).  In the end, the PM said the program cost $1.3B.   
 
While most contractors are very reputable and do not engage in questionable 
tactics, there is a small, pervasive culture with questionable integrity.  PMs and 
contracting officers are aware of those contractors that do not provide straightforward 
cost estimates.  A large ACAT ID contractor is famous for its change orders.  The 
contractor identifies a flaw in the government’s request for proposal.  The flaw or 
missing information in the original request for proposal is overlooked or minimized 
during the bid.  Leaving unclear specifications allows for lower initial costs.  Errors, 
and/or omissions are then discovered and addressed later in the procurement cycle by 
engineering change proposals.  Thus, contractors bid low to win the initial contract, 
afterwards becoming tough negotiators on subsequent modifications to make the money 
back.  A few contractors hold the program hostage.  There is limited competition in the 
defense industry as a whole, so oftentimes the winning bidder is the only true performer.  
Competition throughout the life of a system is required to get the most efficient pricing, 
but there is little oversight done to make sure this happens104.  In some cases, a smaller 
defense infrastructure may not be able to sustain more than one contractor. 
 
6. Tension in Managing Funds 
ACAT ID Program managers employ various techniques to effectively manage 
weapons program.  As funding goes so go the program’s resources.  The Program 
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Executive Officer (PEO) works with the CAE to gain funding support.  To a large degree, 
ACAT ID programs are more advantaged because of higher Congressional oversight and 
scrutiny.  It is almost unheard of for a major defense weapon program to be cancelled105.  
In many cases, just merely mentioning that a program is a designated ACAT 1D gets it a 
lot of attention, so there is a train that moves without the PM pushing it.  Another 
advantage of ACAT I programs is having access to power players.  The PEO, normally a 
one star general officer, can get the PM to a three star officer if a two star general has a 
problem with the program.   
 
Legal constraints and conflicts of interests do not permit program manager 
lobbying; however, PMs have ways to help the process.  Program managers seek indirect 
support from weapons systems contractors.  Lobbying ensures the program’s share of 
funding is maintained and hedges against inevitably deeper budget cuts.  Congressional 
Liaison Office staff consistently lobby support through the POM process.  This technique 
allows the Congressmen to maximize dollars for their district.  Proactive Congressmen 
press for the most weapons funding.  One PM relied on Senator Dan Coates, who actively 
embraced solving weapons procurement issues in his state.  Because the program 
manager is restricted from direct lobbying for his program, he used the contractor to 
lobby the Senator directly.  Senator Coates requested a Congressional inquiry in one case 
where the program’s funding was cut.  The funding was subsequently returned. 
 
There is tension between the program office and the budget offices over 
procurement account management.  Often the PM hides money from the comptroller and 
the comptroller knows it. The PEO knows about it too.  If their relationship is not 
nurtured, the situation deteriorates until there is diminished trust.  For example, a 
particular PEO had ten program managers under his cognizance.  There were eight PMs 
that provided the comptroller with accurate program funding requests.  Unfortunately, 
two program managers’ estimating techniques could not be relied upon.  The comptroller 
put them together and deemed all of them untrustworthy program managers.  The PM felt 
the comptroller turned a deaf ear to any requests and was not open to reclamas.  Five 
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percent funding reductions occurred because the comptroller “perceived” the program 
offices inflated budget numbers.  The PM felt if he did not inflate his numbers as 
everyone else did, his program would be hurt:  “Unless some pachyderm (comptroller) 
comes along and enforces the law forcing the PM to play it straight.”  This illustrates this 
particular PM’s frustration dealing with comptrollers.  Another PM shared a different 
view of her relationship with comptrollers.  She wanted the comptroller to know her 
program projections were sincere.  She networked extensively with her comptroller 
personnel.  When budget personnel did a good job they received letters of appreciations, 
plaques and mementoes for a job well done.  Use of email was minimized because it was 
less personal and was subject to possible misunderstanding.  Instead, management by 
walking around was used to personalize issues.  This PM thinks it is more difficult to say 
no to someone face to face as opposed to on a phone or via an email.   
 
Traditionally, there is tension between the program manager and the hardware 
systems command.  The Navy owns and operates about 4,000 aircraft, containing about 
70,000 repairable parts.  From FY99 to FY02, the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) and its components have seen repair parts support increase from $1.2B to 
$1.8B106.  There are food fights over using particular colors of money.  NAVAIR, an 
HSC, wants the PM to spend more procurement dollars on initial spares.  The PM wants 
to spend fewer dollars on initial spares so he can do more in-service engineering support 
or system engineering.  If the PM spends procurement dollars on initial spares, then that’s 
fewer dollars the HSC has to spend.  The HSC would have greater O&M dollars to apply 
to other aspects of the organization.  The PM fudges the amount of procurement dollars 
needed to get ahead of the game.   
 
While the end user signs off on the amount needed, often it is the contractor who 
determines the amount of spares and provisioning needed.  The mean time between 
failure rates determines the amount of spares required.  The mean time between failure 
rates is estimated from initial onset of the program.  Another method of ensuring spares 
are available is to “hide” developmental spares from the item manager.  Using RDTE and 
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procurement dollars to buy spares allowed one PM to buy and hold spares.  Having a 
“kitty” allowed the program manager to continue production quantities for the intended 
user in the case of an emergency.  The program manager wants his program to remain 
viable and readily supports keeping a certain number of spares available to ensure 
program testing is not halted due to lack of spares.  The Navy’s spare parts shortages are 
attributed to equipment staying in service longer and requiring more replacement parts 
than originally anticipated107.  Funding constraints prevent the necessary spares from 
being purchased.  To get spare parts funding, a program manager sold old equipment to 
foreign governments.  Funding for the program was tracked and decremented dollar for 
dollar for Foreign Military Sales.  The PM’s net gain was zero, but it played well 
politically, and served as a start for future funding. 
 
7. Tension in Tracking Program Costs 
DON distributes operations and maintenance funding to the HSC, program 
managers, major commands and other military units.  Funding is appropriated and 
parceled out to PMs to manage as Congress directs.  PMs exercise authority to change the 
color of funds to buy spares.  The Secretary of Defense must report how operations and 
maintenance funding is used during the fiscal year.  SECDEF pressures the services for 
accurate spare parts expenditure numbers because the current procurement system does 
not adequately track the dollars it receives from Congress108.  In June 2001, and February 
2002, the Department of Defense provided Congress with Exhibit OP-31 reports as an 
integral part of the fiscal year 2002 and 2003 budget requests for O&M.  The OP-31 
provides the services a means to report progress on accurately tracking spares and repair 





     Spares and Repair Parts   
 OP-31Exhibit  (Dollars in Millions)    
         
       FY01/FY02 
Depot Level Repairables (DLRs) FY2000 FY2001 FY2002  Change  
Commodity         
Ships    306.9 310.6 305.4 -5.2  
Aircraft Airframe/Engines  1664.5 1743.6 2116.3 372.7  
Combat Vehicles   0 0 0 0  
Other         
   Missiles   13.8 9.5 9.5 0  
   Communication Equipment  4.2 2.4 4.7 2.3  
   Other Miscellaneous  55.3 53.5 51.6 -1.9  
TOTAL    2041.7 2119.6 2487.5 367.9  
         
Consumables        
Commodity        
Ships    281.4 360.3 372.4 12.1  
Aircraft Airframe/Engines  721.3 719.5 829.5 110  
Combat Vehicles   0 0 0 0  
Other          
   Missiles   10 10.2 17.1 6.9  
   Communication Equipment  10.4 9.9 14.9 5  
   Other Miscellaneous  292.8 324.5 339.8 15.3  
TOTAL    1315.9 1424.4 1573.7 149.3  
         
Increase in Aviation DLRs (AVDLRs) and Consumables is due primarily to increased usage of AVDLRs related 
to aging aircraft and an increase in Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) from 68 percent to 83 percent.  Transfer 
from the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) for all contingency operations costs also 
contributes to the increase.       
Increase in Shipboard Consumables is due primarily to the Southwest Asia (SWA) contingency costs.  
Consumables in the Missiles program increase is due to TRIDENT Extended Refit Periods (ERPs) required as a 
result of converting Trident I (C4) submarines weapon systems to Trident II (D5).     
Communication DLRs and Consumables increase due primarily to transfer of the Naval Reserve Information System 
Office from O&M, NR appropriation and transfer of INMARSAT program from OPN and RDTEN appropriations. 
Other changes between FY01 and FY02 are due primarily to decreases in Working Capital Fund rates.  
         
Source:  Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget Submission Justification of Estimates, June 2001. 
 




     Spares and Repair Parts  
 OP-31Exhibit  (Dollars in Millions)   
        
       FY02/FY03
Depot Level Repairables (DLRs) FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 Change 
Commodity        
Ships    353.2 301 354.2 53.2
Aircraft Airframe   1153.3 1223.2 1364.2 141.1
Aircraft Engine   768.9 815.4 909.5 94
Combat Vehicles   0 0 0 0
Other        
   Missiles   8.5 9.9 9.2 -0.7
   Communication Equipment  2.5 2 2.2 0.2
   Other Miscellaneous  54.6 59.6 66.7 7.1
TOTAL    2341 2411.1 2706 294.9
        
Consumables       
Commodity       
Ships    386.2 330.1 371 40.9
Aircraft Airframe   527.6 516.1 525.6 9.5
Aircraft Engines   351.7 344.1 350.4 6.3
Combat Vehicles   0 0 0 0
Other         
   Missiles   7.5 14.1 13.1 -1
   Communication Equipment  9.1 7.4 16.7 9.3
   Other Miscellaneous  321.3 301.9 313.3 11.4
TOTAL    1603.4 1513.7 1590.1 76.4
        
        
Increases in AVDLRs and Aviation Consumables are due primarily to increased budget usage of AVDLRs 
and consumables related to aging aircraft and increases in Working Capital Fund rates.  
Other changes between FY02 and FY03 are due primarily to decreases in Working Capital Fund rates. 
Source:  DON Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Estimates, Justification of Estimates February 2002.  
 
Figure 16.   Report Op-31:  Spares Submitted to Congress on 2/02 
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In reality, funds cannot be easily tracked.  The Navy lacks the detailed 
information needed to document the amount program managers spend to purchase new 
and repaired spare parts from the supply systems.  During the PM interviews, there was 
only one PM who identified the DOD contract administration and financial management 
system, (Mechanization of Contract Administration System) (MOCAS)).  He found 
MOCAS to be cumbersome and difficult to use as a day-to-day management tool.  All the 
others interviewed were unfamiliar with the system.  All PMs interviewed were unable to 
match the program’s real time costs to the comptroller’s because the financial 
management system used was slow in updating obligations, expenditures and outlays.  
PMs could tell pretty much what was happening with their funds, but there was no real 
time snapshot concurrently available at the comptroller shop.  Needless to say, there is 
tension between OSD and the services for accurate spare parts documentation.109   
 
PMs admitted that it was “a bear to get a handle on where the money was” at any 
one point in time.  In house expenditures could be tracked very easily, but they found the 
external accounting system unsupportive.  Not being able to communicate effectively 
with the comptroller increases tension between the offices.  One PM sent a budget analyst 
off-site, to its weapons test ground to reconcile the amount obligated to date.  One PM 
used a commercially adapted program to track her funds.  In each case the PMs had to 
constantly reconcile their books with the comptroller.  One PM’s funds were taken 
because the delay in the amount of funds obligated indicated an under expenditure of 
funds.  Because the funds did not appear in the system as obligated as they actually were, 
the comptroller took the funds because it looked like the program manager was under-
obligating his budget.  The error was corrected in a few hours, after budget reconciliation.   
 
The President’s FY03 budget incorporated force structure changes that reflected a 
transformational force110.  After the Cold War and Desert Storm ended, the nation’s 
peace dividend resulted in declining defense dollars.  If not for the war on terrorism, there 
would be even greater decreases in fiscal year funds.  The decommissioning of some 
older aircraft and ships with high O&M costs relative to their combat capability allowed 
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funding to flow to programs that may not have been otherwise funded.  Examples include 
the funding of two SSGN conversions and the employment of three frigates dedicated to 
Homeland Defense.  Figure 4 shows recent budget trends for the Navy’s O&MN, 
RDTEN and weapons procurement accounts.  FY02 defense supplemental legislation 
increased FY02 numbers.  FY03 defense numbers promises to be higher with the current 




f the Navy o         
FY 2003 Budget Summary by Appropriation     
(In millions of dollars)        
      FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 
         
Operation and Maintenance, Navy   25600 26949 29123
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps   2928 2892 3385
Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve   1019 1004 1169
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve     
         
Aircraft Procurement, Navy    8032 8261 8125
Weapons Procurement, Navy    1439 1426 1858
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy   11346 9420 7629
Other Procurement, Navy    3437 4020 4346
Procurement, Marine Corps    1190 980 1298
Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps  543 457 846
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy  9631 11137 11507
Totals      65165 66546 69286
 
Figure 17.   Recent OMN, RDTEN, APN and WPN Budget Trends 
 
8. Savings and Cost Overruns 
Another strategy PMs use includes inflating budget requirements to cover 
potential cost overruns.  Old money may be moved from one program to cover the 
funding shortage on another.  Program managers are reluctant to use the term cost 
overrun.  Identifying a program with the term “cost overrun” reflects poorly on the PM’s 
management and to a broader degree questions his oversight abilities.  A cost overrun 
connotes deep concern for the program’s direction and whispers of the program’s 
eventual death.  One PM said, “The nature of cost contracts is such that the contractor is 
aware that the government bears the risk and he may not be concerned with meeting the 
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award or incentive fee thresholds on cost plus incentive/award fee contracts.”  He added, 
“Principally if there are cost contracts, there are no cost overruns.”  The possibility of 
exceeding the cost threshold exists.  Unlike having a cost overrun, exceeding the cost 
threshold is not “bad management” from the program manager’s perspective.  The 
program managers tended to insist that clarifying cost overruns was rare if the 
government assumes risk on a cost contract. 
 
When the contractor exceeds the cost threshold, the PM informs everyone as soon 
as possible.  If the PM needs to rebaseline the dollars, then he must go to the Defense 
Acquisition Executive to ask for more money.  Depending on the cost, rebaselining may 
require Congressional approval.  The contractor knows he will get his money for the level 
of effort performed.  Unless there is a default for cause (DFC) matter, the contractor is 
paid and the funding comes from a pool of limited sources.  In the case of the A12 
contract, it was a fixed price contract and it did have a cost overrun.  It was terminated for 
DFC reasons.  Finger pointing between government and industry continues as litigation 
costs escalate.  
 
Despite positive results of using projected savings as a negotiating tool for 
additional funding, it remains a nebulous concept.  PMs limit their discussions on 
projected savings during POM budgeting because they are not comfortable defining the 
savings.  It is used by some PMs to demonstrate the usefulness of embracing projected 
savings however.  For example, the Air Force used 14 HF stations around the world, 
which were manned by several airmen.  The overhead to feed and house airmen and to 
maintain station facilities exceeded several million dollars.  By turning the outlying 
stations into remote bases, which fed functions to one station located at Andrews AFB, 
the station was able to save $17M per year.  The PM used the savings on the program as 
justification for future upgrades and to fully fund future programs.  Because of an 
enhanced reputation, the PM received little questions on the other programs and 
improved the program’s life.   
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9. Special Techniques 
PMs commit and obligate funds as soon as practicable at the start of the fiscal 
year.  One PM said, “The first quarter is just too soon because contracts are not ready.”  
The second quarter was best.  If he waited till the third quarter to obligate and/or commit 
funds, he left himself open to be raided.”  The quicker funds are obligated, the better 
manager you are perceived because the program does not become a target.  MDAPs 
almost never get cancelled because of their high visibility.  Generally, PMs obligate 
funding by the second quarter of the fiscal year because if they did not obligate funds by 
then, they would be taken away to fund other programs.  This PEO’s ACAT I programs 
committed its money early and got more visibility.  Thus, money was never pulled from 
this program.   
 
The PM communicates with the user and the contractor.  Effective 
communication with all involved reaps tremendous benefits.  A PM’s program is lobbied 
early and often.  Contractors consistently lobby for program support.  Three PMs said 
that during the POM budget process, they walk the halls (of the Pentagon) and talk to the 
proper people.  The PEO of two PMs visited Congress.  He must be prepared to defend 
his program on short notice.  A commitment to communicate and teaming with the 
Pentagon helps to reduce budget-cut risks.  One program manager consistently talked to 
her component’s Pentagon staff to ask for the proper justification needed to keep the 
program safely away from budget cuts.  The PM learns how to provide a good reclama.  
He must always be prepared.  The PM knows where he can give up money.  He knows 
where the hurt is, so he tries not to expose that hurt.  This program always got extra 
funding during the fiscal year.   
 
The PMs said, requests to take program funds “always” come late Friday evening 
and responses are due 0730 Monday mornings in Washington DC.  In cases where the 
office is located out of the DC area, one PM said his reclamas were required on even 
shorter notice.  This required the PM be particularly adept at meeting deadlines when he 
received a mark.  He always had “War plans” in place to prepare last minute reclamas.  
65
Key personnel were identified in advance to work late Fridays and weekends to stave off 
the budget cut.  The PM authorized overtime at the stroke of the pen to compensate his 
staff.   
 
Integrated Product Teams (IPT) gives the PM greater flexibility.  One ACAT I 
program manager used integrated product teams to determine costs, measure performance 
and monitor delivery.  The PMs interviewed used IPTs to plan program structure and 
documentation and resolve issues.  Overarching Integrated Product Teams moved 
milestone phase III decisions up.  One PM said, “The goal is to resolve as many issues 
and concerns at the lowest level possible and to expeditiously escalate issues that need 
resolution at a higher level.  This showed that IPTs worked.  The ability to get all the 
players together to work through a problem saves time and money.”  In many cases, 
introduction of IPTs meant that milestone III meetings have little or no issues because 
they were addressed during the IPT meetings.  The PM briefs the DAB on program 
progress during scheduled milestones and as requested by the DAB or PM.   
 
Programs may end up with more funding than necessary in a given year for a 
myriad of reasons including excellent contractor lobbying techniques or under obligating 
funds because the program slipped.  The PM is faced with having to return excess funds.  
The challenge for the PM is that any funds returned are essentially “lost”.  Returning 
funds means it will be difficult to get fully funded the following year.  His POM position 
would be weakened considerably.  Program managers resist turning over funds without 
getting compromises, compensation or consideration for funds transferred from the PEO.  
Most likely, he works within the PEO to ensure that the funds are “loaned” instead of 
returned to OSD or Congress.  The PEO directs a program swap, if possible. 
 
Program swaps are made to manage funds in the PEO’s sphere of influence.  
Here’s how it works.  The PM borrows money from another program within his PEO, if 
his program did not get enough money.  He likely needs it to remain viable or to remain 
on schedule.  Funds are paid back to the other program in the next fiscal year.  As long as 
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the program manager stays within $4M RDTE and $10M procurement dollars, it does not 
trigger Congressional oversight and is considered a wash within the PEO.  Moving funds 
greater than $4M RDTE and $10M procurement require Congressional approval.  The 
PM requests funds are realigned to another program if it is in the best interest of the 
program(s).  One PM obligated funds early because the contractor’s delivery schedule 
slipped.  Because procurement dollars within the PEO are planned and obligated over 5 
years, this can easily be lost if that money is not identified.   
 
Managing the funds expenditure rate is fundamental to successfully keeping the 
initial distribution within the PEO.  The comptroller targets under-obligated programs 
during the fiscal year.  PMs have developed ways of hiding money by maintaining a 
management reserve.  Program managers readily deny having a management reserve of 
funds.  In confidence there is an unspoken management reserve they use to effectively 
manage costs.  If Congress, or OSD, or the component find out there is extra money on a 
program, the money is taken.  One PM talked to a business associate at a national range 
and said that he was going to “other government activity (OGA)” $8M, but asked that 
that office not spend more than $5M.  The other government activity in this case was the 
missile test-range that otherwise received funding from this particular program office.  In 
this case, the program manager intentionally “gave” the OGA more money than 
necessary to hide those funds from the comptroller.  The comptroller was unable to touch 
the extra $3M because it was no longer visible to him.  The PM and the missile test-range 
kept their agreement.   
 
Section 845 authority is a way to test creative procurement strategies – such as 
teaming or consortia – with traditional defense contractors and industry areas not 
normally associated with government contracts.  Under this authority, a new business 
relationship, involving changes in traditional business processes or intellectual property 
rights is created to leverage commercial investments and allow the PM to influence the 
design, development and availability of commercial technologies111.  It also allows the 
PM to take advantage of commercial business processes such as using the integrated 
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product team approach rather than a traditional prime-subcontractor structure112.  
Teaming is an opportunity to use O&M funds to pay for portions or all of the parts, 
supplies, and administrative support.  The more O&M funds used for this purpose the 
more procurement dollars remain to buy weapons. 
 
Used effectively, teaming government and industry is also an effective means of 
reducing costs.  One PM said, “A contractor and an in-house government contractor 
proposed a software upgrade in the amount of $8M.  The team approach was intended to 
save money.  In the end, the program cost $16M, - twice the original amount contracted.  
Each entity was paid $8M, because there was no teaming accomplished.”  Teaming 
amongst contractors is encouraged to save funds.  Teaming industry partners is more 
prevalent and is necessary due to a significantly decreased contractor base.  Given a 
smaller base of contractors, teaming enables DOD to realize savings despite little 
competition.  Construction of the first two Virginia Class submarines began in 1998 
under the teaming arrangement between General Dynamics and Newport News Naval 
Shipbuilding.   
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Program managers are in a challenging position, having responsibility for millions 
of dollars in military weaponry.  Training and qualifications required to get an ACAT I 
program manager up to speed are designed to ensure the PM is very knowledgeable about 
acquisition in general and about his program in particular.  He must possess extensive 
program office experience.  A novice to major weapon system procurement could cost 
the Department millions and could effectively end the program.  PMs answer to Congress 
and military superiors to determine program viability and affordability.  They engage in a 
variety of techniques centered on maximizing production at the best cost (or best value) 
available.  The best cost selection does not necessarily equal the lowest cost.  It 
represents the best value for the items produced.  The funding stream varies as the threat 
environment changes.  In the War on Terrorism, transformational systems are likely to 
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receive the best funding at the expense of less “visible” programs.  Increased weapons 
funding does not translate into increased funding across all systems.   
 
The PM maximizes his funds through indirect lobbying of Congress, with his 
PEO, within the Pentagon and industry.  They serve as viable sources of receiving 
revenue.  There is competition and cooperation in and among the entities.  Optimistic cost 
estimates sell the program.  Congress wants PMs to deliver the most effective and least 
costly weapons.  Along the way, program managers realize that their program is “taxed” 
by OSD, the component’s budget office and perhaps the HSC as the funds trickle down 
from Congress.  Program managers plan accordingly by submitting a higher than needed 
budget.   
 
Cost estimates are used as a gauge of a program’s estimated affordability.  
Unfortunately cost estimates are “gamed” by the contractor and the PM.  Oftentimes, the 
new system comes in much higher than the initial cost estimate.  Ultimately, there is 
pressure to reign in costs from Congress and through the auspices of the SECDEF.  The 
pressure increases as near-term, low-value, unrealistic cost estimates balloon in the out 
years. Pressure to produce and deliver weapons quicker and at a lower cost is the trend.  
Care has to be taken to manage against cost overruns.  Being described as a program with 
cost overruns is reflected as poor management and results in greater Congressional and 
Departmental scrutiny. 
 
PMs employ various techniques to deliver weapons at the best value.  Effective 
communication, hiding funds in an unauthorized management reserve, and teaming are 
designed to deliver modern weaponry on schedule and at the lowest cost.  Overarching 
IPTs give the PM greater control over the entire process and cut down on developmental 
and production errors.  OTE is shortened because the PM balances LRIP effectiveness 
against increased EMD costs.  Oftentimes a determination is made well in advance of 
clear evidence supporting the decision.  Projected savings are used to resist deeper cuts 
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and to promote the program’s effective leadership in saving the government money.  This 
chapter built on Chapters II and III.  While there are instances where the program 
managers did not emphasize some reform efforts mentioned in Chapter III, this does not 
discredit chapter III’s information.  Analysis of the causes for exception will be examined 
in Chapter VI.  The next step is to analyze two ACAT I programs using the background 
information of the first three chapters.  An analysis of techniques discussed in 
conjunction with actual programmatic techniques to keep programs viable will ensue to 
determine if acquisition reform over the last ten years has been good for weapons 




V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO ACAT I PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter builds on the previous four chapters.  Chapter I introduced the thesis 
question of whether procurement reform has helped weapon acquisition of major defense 
acquisition programs.  Chapters II and III provided detailed background on substantive 
data discussing procurement reform over the past ten years.  Acquisition reform, as 
defined and discussed in this thesis, is a series of changes incorporated into DOD’s 
procurement system.  Procurement reform is fluid, where the end is not defined per se, 
but instead it is evolving to provide the war fighter with weapons more efficiently at the 
best value available.  Significant legislative, administrative and procedural data were 
presented.  Then, an analysis of perennial issues in procurement reform was undertaken 
in Chapter III.  Building upon the perennial issues in Chapter IV, five former program 
managers were asked questions to determine if the procurement reform analyses were 
consistent with their experience.   
 
In Chapter IV, nine programmatic themes were investigated.  Incorporating those 
programmatic themes, this chapter looks at procurement reform from the perspective of 
two current ACAT I programs, DDG 51 and LPD 17.  The chapter’s comparative 
analysis is based on available public information on program funding, procurement 
success and resourcefulness in dealing with programmatic challenges.  Like the previous 
chapter’s comparative analysis, this chapter includes quantitative and qualitative analysis.  
There is a strong emphasis on empirical and anecdotal comparison as well.  Information 
gathered for these ACAT I programs has higher visibility, in keeping with the high level 
of attention necessary for programs funded in excess of $1B annually.  Table 1 identifies 
DOD’s most expensive weapons programs.  The dollars involved in these programs gain 
them higher attention than lesser-funded programs.  Though approved and funded, the 





        
Rank Program      
Cost 
($B) 
1 Joint Strike Fighter (2,852 aircraft)  250.0 
2 Virginia Class Submarine (30 submarines)  65.2 
3 F-22 Fighter (341 aircraft)   62.7 
4 DDG -51 Destroyer (57 ships)   54.0 
5 F/A 18E/F Fighter (548 aircraft)   47.0 
6 C-17 Air lifter (134 aircraft)   44.9 
7 B-2 Bomber (21 aircraft)   44.4 
8 Comanche Helicopter (1,292 helicopters)  43.0 
9 V-22 Tilt rotor Aircraft (458 aircraft)  36.2 
10 D-5 Trident II Missile (453 missiles)  27.4 
11 Seawolf Submarines (3 submarines)  13.4 
12 LPD 17 (12 ships)    9.9 
13 CVN 77 Aircraft carrier (1 ship)   5.2 
       
Sources:  Costs compiled by the Center for Defense Information from DOD selected 
acquisition reports and Congressional Budget Office cost estimates for the  
Joint Strike Fighter and Comanche programs.    
Note:  DDG 51 Qty differs from thesis data. Table does not reflect current costs. 
 
Table 1 Total Costs for DOD’s Most Expensive Programs 
 
1. Establishing a Start Date 
Before delving into comparison analysis of these two programs, I will provide a 
baseline date to compare changes in their procurement patterns.  Prior research has shown 
the average length of an Acquisition Category (ACAT) I program in the engineering and 
manufacturing development (EMD) phase is 7.4 years.113  DDG 51 is a complex 
weapon system that took many years to design, test and produce.  From contract award to 
delivery, it took 7 years to be delivered.  LPD 17 will be delivered 8 years after contract 
award, provided there are no further delays. Assuming acquisition reform first became 
effective within the field of acquisition workforce on or about Jan 96, it could only have 
an EMD effect on programs whose MS III Defense Acquisition Program Board (DAB) 
meeting was after July 1996.  The MS III date is important because that is the point at 
which the existing DOD acquisition systems will be measured.114  Baselining the start 
date attempts to describe and capture the level of success of a system.   The Milestone III 
(MS III) decision generally concludes the EMD phase.   
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 This chapter sets a start date (baseline) for procurement reform to determine the 
level of changes in the acquisition program.115  DDG 51 completed the EMD phase, but 
significant programmatic changes were made prior to and since that date.  In many 
aspects, DDG 51 has evolved into a very different ship than originally designed due to 
extensive upgrades and programmatic changes.  LPD 17’s MS II date was June 1996.  
LPD 17’s MS III date has yet to occur.  LPD 17 employed new development techniques 
with a heavy emphasis on computer-aided design (CAD) to present a “realistic” ship in 
the design phase.  Start of production of the LPD 17 lead ship follows a 48-month period 
of design, material procurement and engineering.  Through the use of extensive 
automation, advanced materials and equipment, and reduced crew size, LPD 17 is 
projected to have the lowest possible operating and maintenance costs over its lifetime.  
The first ship will be delivered in late 2004.116  Figure 18 shows the varying approaches 
to acquisition and procurement that DDG 51 undertook and that which LPD 17 is 
undertaking.  DDG 51 is under the “Update Design after Build” or “Flights” model 





Figure 18.   LPD 17 Design For Ownership Diagram 
 
Program managers of newer programs like the Virginia class submarines, DDX 
and CVNX, make extensive use of teaming and Integrated Product Development (IPD).117  
LPD 17 will be compared with DDG 51 on its use of teaming; life cycle cost savings; and 
overall design innovations to compare changes in acquisition reforms.  Assuming a static 
environment, program success comes down to the standard parameters of cost, schedule 
and performance during EMD.118  Programs are not held in isolation however.  The 
President, Congress, program managers, budgeters, lobbyists and special interest groups 
play a part in how programs are funded.  Funding determines how quickly and how many 
weapons are procured.  Given that DDG 51 began before significant acquisition reforms 
of the last ten years, there should be clear differences in their programmatic approaches. 
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2. Congressional and Industry Influence 
Select members of Congress, industry watchdogs and lobbyists press for 
increased weapons production.  There has been tension between Congress, the President 
and industry in the last 10 years, because the executive branch exerted pressure to 
produce less weaponry.  To sustain a 116 surface combatant force structure, four Arleigh 
Burke Destroyers must be procured annually.119  For now, the Navy falls short of this 
goal.  Congress appropriated an additional DDG-51 in FY03 (for a total of three) that 
included advance procurement for a third DDG-51 in FY04.  This moves the Navy closer 
to its goal and sustains the industrial base to meet follow-on surface combatant 
construction programs.120  
 
Industry insiders and lobbyists argue that despite problems in weapons 
procurement, shipbuilding has to increase to meet minimal defense standards in the out 
years. The FY03 five-year defense plan drops the Navy to a fleet of only 244 ships as 
older, technologically obsolete ships reach their decommissioning dates.  This force 
structure is 56 ships below that identified as the minimum required in the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).121  Some argue newer, more sophisticated weapon 
systems are more capable, thus eliminating the need for one-for-one replacement.  
Weapon procurement hawks warn, “No matter how young or technologically capable a 
ship, it cannot be in two places at the same time.”122  This excuse also fails to recognize 
the four to eight year construction lead time of warships, or the fact that further delay in 
increasing the build rate will make it impossible for a severely weakened and smaller 
weapons industry to be able to build the significantly larger numbers of ships annually 
that would be necessary to overcome the ship deficit.  The American Shipbuilding 
Association argues if the Navy began to procure 12-ships a year today, it would take 21 
years just to make up the 42-ship shortfall that existed at the end of FY02 in maintaining 
a 300-ship Navy.123  The American Shipbuilding Association assumes a 300 ship Navy 
as identified in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.  The actual number of ships in 
FY02 was 308.  Industry experts argue that procurement of two San Antonio class ships 
per year is required to meet the Marine Corps’ 12 Amphibious Ready Group and fiscally 
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constrained 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift force.  Though beset with 
delays, the first ship is ahead of its revised production schedule, according to some 
industry insiders.124   
 
LPD 17 is a clear example of how Congress’ influence in defense contracting is 
politicized.  Weapons contracts flow into the states and districts of powerful members of 
Congress who sit on the Senate and House Armed Services Committees rather than to the 
companies that can do the best work for the best price.125  The Congressional delegation 
that informed Avondale of its award of LPD 17 included House Appropriations 
Committee chairman, Bob Livingston (R-LA), and Senator J. Bennett Johnson (D-LA) 
whose committees funded LPD 17 and U.S. Representative William Jefferson (D-LA) 
whose House National Security Committee authorized LPD 17.126  Avondale’s 
headquarters is in Louisiana.   
 
B. INITIAL DESIGN 
 
The Arleigh Burke (DDG-51 Class) acquisition program was awarded in 1985.  It 
achieved substantial acquisition program savings over the life of the program.  The 
original plans were for 20 ships, with a potential for up to 60 ships.  Current plans are for 
at least 64 DDG 51 class destroyers through FY04, representing an estimated total 
program cost of $45B to $50B with the last ship scheduled for delivery in 2010.127  This 
ship was designed to take advantage of evolving technology while reducing ship 
construction costs.   
 
Secretary of the Navy Dalton said, "LPD 17 is a first. The Navy is on a frontier of 
a new way of doing things through teaming with industry partners and streamlining the 
administration and acquisition process."  This statement has proven true as the LPD 17, 
the first amphibious ship designed for the twenty-first century, continues to be on the 
leading edge of new product and process innovations in all areas of the acquisition cycle.  
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A new approach to test program coordination and management has been adopted by the 
LPD 17 Test Team.  Secretary Dalton said, “Current realities such as fiscal constraints, 
technological leaps, and manpower shortfalls have highlighted the necessity of doing it 
smarter and getting it right the first time.”  The LPD 17 Test Team exemplifies a "new 
test paradigm".  It melds the traditionally separate test activities of the government and 
shipbuilding contractor into one coordinated effort while still allowing each to maintain 
the responsibilities of their respective domains.  The entire LPD 17 Team is committed to 
the planning, design, and delivery of fully tested and operational ships.128  
 
1. Design Complexity 
The PM has a demanding job integrating complex weapon systems into one 
efficient and effective weapon.  He is tasked with managing enormous funding and 
technical resources.  Integrating complex weapon systems, like LPD 17, takes an average 
of 11 years to develop, produce and field.129  Figure 19 illustrate DDG 51’s program 
manager reporting structure within the hardware systems command (HSC).  The PEO 
relies on the HSC (NAVSEA) for administrative support, including Comptroller 
functions for financial management.  Fund flow for both PEO and HSC funds with single 
conveyance, via normal path for appropriation.  The HSC has limited influence on the 
PM’s funds because of its scope of responsibility.  As revealed in programmatic 
techniques in Chapter IV, the PM has nearly complete control of his budget.  Figure 19 
shows funding is distributed primarily among the Contractor, NAVSEA field activities, 
SPAWAR and NAVSEA participating resource managers.  The level of responsibility 
and complexity involved with DDG 51 are similar for LPD 17 with the added 
responsibility of addressing Marine Corps requirements.   
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Figure 19.   DDG 51 Program Manager’s Profile 
 
LPD 17 is projected to have significantly lower cost of ownership due to its 
reduced manning, use of modular systems, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology, 
and a high level of systems integration.  An Avondale Industries paper states, “The 
design for LPD 17 incorporates state of-the-art self-defense capabilities, C4I (command, 
control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems, and reduced-signature 
technologies that will make it the most survivable amphibious ship ever put to sea.   
 
2. Emphasis on Life Cycle Savings 
DOD has undertaken an effort to reduce the total ownership cost for weapon 
systems, while improving their performance, reliability, and adopting initiatives that 
produce significant near term operations and support savings.  Life cycle costs grew from 
peripheral considerations to becoming crucial in measuring both programs’ effectiveness.  
Life-cycle savings are a huge player in programmatic success.  Each program office cites 
the long term savings its program achieves.  Life cycle savings initiatives are forwarded 
to Congress to justify the program’s effectiveness in cost savings.  Design and cost 
impact decisions determine more than 80 percent of the total life cycle system costs.130  
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The need for life-cycle savings grows with each weapon’s ever increasing cost to field 
the next generation.   
 
Over the past three budget cycles up-front investment funding has been provided 
for a broad range of initiatives identified by the Reduction in Total Ownership Costs 
panel under the chairmanship of AT&L.  Five initiatives are recommended for funding in 
this budget cycle.131  Since this is the fourth year that up front funding is to be provided, 
it could be assumed that prior year efforts are beginning to generate results.132  Reduced 
Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC) initiatives, like the Army’s helicopter RTOC, must 
show both direct and indirect readiness improvements, as well as O&S cost savings.133    
 
Reductions to the Navy's total ownership costs are a key driver in design 
decisions associated with LPD 17’s projected 40-year service life.  Team 17's plan to 
reduce the TOC of operating and maintaining the ship calls for investments that reduce 
operating and support costs.  For example, key shipboard piping systems carrying 
saltwater will be made of titanium, which is more expensive up-front but is more durable 
over forty years.  In addition to identifying the best systems and maintenance strategies to 
reduce TOC, the program manager is working to dramatically reduce crew size, which is 
a major expense for any ship.  Manning levels are twenty percent below preliminary 
projections (from 450 to 360), and further reductions are being explored in areas that will 
not degrade the ship's war fighting and organic maintenance capabilities.   
 
In an effort to improve configuration management and reduce the cost of 
information development, all LPD 17 data is being developed and maintained in 
electronic form in an Integrated Product Data Environment (IPDE).  IPDE is the most 
complete system used in the shipbuilding industry for the design-through-life cycle 
management of a ship.  It is designed to provide timely, accurate and configuration-
controlled information to lower total ownership costs.134  This collaborative data 
environment enables the various design specialties on the LPD 17 team to develop, 
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integrate, and access data in real time.  Team 17 has implemented IPDE to facilitate data 
integration, reduce redundancy, and ensure greater accuracy.  This IPDE effort 
significantly improves Team 17's ability to manage information and to reduce costs.  
 
Furthermore, the Navy’s use of alternate shipbuilders with one lead builder is 
designed to maintain competition and ensures the Navy is not dependent on one 
contractor.  In fact, politics play a role in subsidizing shipyards by keeping two yards 
when demand is only sufficient to maintain one.135  Ingalls Shipbuilding and Bath Iron 
Works have a long history of building USN ships.  Using experienced US Navy 
shipbuilders versus a commercial shipbuilding contractor arguably is a crucial point.  
There are different cost accounting rules, lessons learned and production quantity 
differences that specialized USN builders have over commercial shipbuilders.  Avondale 
primarily manufactures ocean-going vessels for both the military and commercial 
markets.136  Figure 20 explains current shipbuilding expertise and relative complexity 
with each shipyard. 
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Figure 20.   New Shipbuilding Market Sectors 
 
Historically, Avondale’s military-related ships are primarily logistics ships for 
Military Sealift Command and the far less complicated LSD, thus they are not adept at 
integrating complex weapon systems because that is not their primary business.  
Overhead and costing rates are vastly different for the Navy as opposed to the 
commercial business with which Avondale is more familiar.  Commercial enterprises also 
serve as a “stop gap” measure for Avondale because of the small amount of Navy 
business it receives.  It remains to be seen if diversification into Navy shipbuilding will 
be a boon or bust for Avondale.  Arguably, design delays can be attributed in part to 
Avondale’s lack of broad experience in this area.  Avondale alliance partners, like 
Intergraph Corporation, help to fill the void in military design and expertise not available 
on-site.   
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In support of Milestone II, the Cost Assessment Improvement Group (CAIG) 
determined that Avondale’s teaming costs were ten to fifteen percent more than projected 
if just one yard was used.137  This is because the Avondale/BIW split-buy reduced 
learning at each plant and increased overhead.  In the preceding two years, the CAIG has 
determined that costs have grown an additional nine percent to 24 percent.  Furthermore, 
Ingalls Shipbuilding has a higher yard specific overhead rate that increases costs.138 
 
DDG 51 achieves life cycle cost savings through reengineering and improving 
existing systems and processes.  DDG 51’s Class Affordability Program is dedicated to 
evaluating processes and finding ways to do things better.  Cost reductions have been 
achieved through the DDG-51 Class Affordability Program in a cooperative effort among 
PMS 400, Supervisor of Shipbuilding, shipbuilders, and other defense contractors.  The 
Navy uses a rigorous review process to evaluate the technical and cost reduction merits of 
innovative ideas while also managing the associated risks. The result is reduced costs to 
the Navy and shipbuilders through cost reductions achieved on the shipbuilding contract 
share line.139  The DDG-51 program realized $269M in cumulative cost reductions for 
fiscal years 1985 through 1995 ships (with an additional $330M projected through FY 
01) through the Navy's partnership with industry in the DDG-51 Class Affordability 
Program.140   
 
3. Design Challenges 
The program office touts LPD 17’s success, but as with any complex undertaking, 
there have been design problems requiring immediate resolution.  LPD 17's CAD 
benefited from fleet and Marine Corps input to an extent never before achieved during a 
warship acquisition program.  An example of this trend is the ship's new refrigeration 
system.  Concerns rose over the amount of time and training needed to service older 
refrigeration units due to overcrowded conditions and burdensome maintenance 
requirements.  LPD 17’s design was modified following the receipt of numerous valuable 
suggestions from Fleet Sailors.  Instead of relying on four 1.5-ton refrigeration units, two 
4.6-ton twin-screw units will be installed to provide greater efficiency and operating 
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margins.  An estimated $50 million in savings will be achieved as a result of the new 
systems’ reduced manning and training requirements over the program’s life cycle.   
 
The PM said that a Production Readiness Review indicated LPD 17’s process was 
on track, but significant design delays have occurred.  The Navy attributes the delays to 
the ship's overall design complexity and to several other factors.  First, there are 
difficulties in design integration:  Design is ongoing at three shipyards.  For that reason, 
"a higher level of management attention" is required than if the entire design was being 
worked in the traditional fashion at one location.141  Secondly, the CAD environment is 
more complex than originally expected:  The CAD process has presented unique 
challenges that have inhibited the concurrent development and continuous improvement 
required: (a) to model such structures as curvatures in thick steel plate and (b) for the 
modeling of millions of components.  Then, there is a shortage of designers:  The 
industry-wide shortage has been a major factor in causing the delays.  Intergraph 
Corporation increased program support by 25 percent, and Avondale increased its support 
by 70 percent.  Intergraph Corporation is responsible for developing an integrated data 
environment focusing on design, construction and life-cycle data collection for LPD 
17.142  Additionally, the expansion in demand for skilled designers required more time to 
train them in the new processes.  Finally, complications caused by "lofting" requirements 
have delayed implementation.  The CAD process provides a design that is more efficient 
to build, but the resultant lofting - the process that converts three-dimensional design 
information into fabrication instructions - is more complex than was expected.143   
 
Despite the delays and increased up-front design costs, Navy officials see several 
long-term benefits and efficiencies for future shipbuilding programs resulting from the 
steep learning curve experienced in the LPD 17 program. The CAD process has provided 
a method to significantly lower risk and design costs.  CAD also reduces construction 
errors.  Program officials projected an estimated $4.3 billion savings in operation and 
support costs because of the new design processes.  The program office states 
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development problems that caused delays and cost overruns in the design and 




1. Programmatic Quantity Changes 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 in Chapter III showed reduced procurement funding in the 
1990’s, for weapons and shipbuilding.  The Navy, like the other services has to get 
enough funding to support operations and to get new weaponry.  Thus, the total number 
of DDG 51s and LPD 17s procured per year changes.  Figure 4 shows a dip in 
procurement dollars in the mid-1990’s, which directly affected DDG 51 production.  To 
meet the high demand for offsets (prior to September 11), the President’s budget removed 
a ship each year for FY03 through FY06 and removed other critical modernization 
efforts.145  Threats, lobbying and Congressional intervention occurred.  Thus, Bath Iron 
Works (BIW) and Ingalls Shipbuilding were recently awarded fixed-price incentive 
multiyear contracts worth a combined total of $5 billion for construction of six additional 
DDG 51-class Aegis Destroyers.146  Exercising the multiyear contract increases the 
number of ships from one ship to seven ships total.147  The additional six ships complete 
the seven-ship DDG multiyear contract for BIW over the 2002-2005 timeframe.  The last 
ship of the award, DDG 112, is scheduled for delivery to the U.S. Navy in December 
2010.   
 
The Milestone IV DAB directed the Navy program for a total of 64 DDG 51s.  To 
date a total of 52 ships have been awarded.  Thirty-three ships have been delivered.  
Figure 21 (DDG 51 production schedule) shows original production levels of four ships 
per year were reduced to three ships per year and subsequently reduced to two ships per 
year.  Congress added a third ship in the most recent budget.  Figure 21, the DD Form 
2454, shows two ships per year were programmed in the President’s Budget for FY03 to 
FY06.  Figure 22, an Analysis of Ship Estimates, demonstrates the program office’s use 
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of multiyear contracts.  Multiyear contracts lower overhead costs by spreading it among a 
larger ship pool.   
 
Figure 21.   FY03 Budget Item Justification Sheet (DDG 51) 
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Figure 22.   FY03 Analysis of Ship Cost Estimates (DDG 51) 
 
Multi-year contracts ensure contractor stability and save the government money.  
Figure 23 shows the use of multi-year contracts and the projected delivery date for future 
DDG 51’s.  Design delays and high initial start-up costs for LPD 17 necessitated the 
Navy initiating a memorandum of understanding between the affected shipyards.  Two of 
the multi-year contract ships awarded to BIW in fiscal 2004 and fiscal 2005 are in 
accordance with the memorandum of understanding (MOU), "Concerning the 
Reallocation of LPD-17 and DDG-51 Ship Construction Workload," signed and 
announced by BIW, Ingalls Shipbuilding and the Navy. 148  
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Figure 23.   FY03 Ship Production Schedule (DDG 51) 
 
2. Advance Procurement 
Like the DDG 51 program, LPD 17’s funding fluctuates depending upon whether 
funds are identified to be taken, programmatic lobbying or due to the threat.  Because 
LPD 17 is still in development, its more significant funding cuts have come in advance 
procurement.  Conversely, its largest funding increases have been advance procurement.  
For example, in FY00, Congress approved $460 million for the LPD 17, which is in 
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's home state of Mississippi.149  Advance procurement 
of long-lead materials is an important method of keeping subcontractors employed while 
design and other production related details are worked out.  Long lead materials consist 
of items such as the main engines, generators, controllable pitch propellers, and reduction 
gears.  The use of advance procurement funds has not been sequential nor has Congress 
identified cuts in a systematic way.   
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Due to program risk, the Navy delayed ship procurement to one per year from 
FY03 to FY05.  Although DON admits that keeping GFE and CFE procurements on 
schedule while construction of the ships have been delayed is not justifiable, they still 
reflect the use of FY01 and FY02 advance procurement funds to buy materials for the 
LPD 22, which has slipped to FY04.  Materials would be purchased up to four years in 
advance of its 2005 construction start date.  Accordingly, the alternative directs the Navy 
to use all available advance procurement funds in FY01 and FY02 to support LPD 21, the 
FY03 ship.  This will result in a reduction of $192M in FY03.  The LPD 22’s FY04 full 
funding line was adjusted accordingly.  The adjustments take into account that a portion 
of the FY01 funds have already been obligated to support LPD 22 and that FY02 
annualized engineering support and Rolling Airframe Missile multiyear procurements are 
still necessary.150 
 
3. Program Cost Reduction and Funding Concerns 
Historically, tensions over the amount of DDG 51s to produce have been an issue 
for this program because of the dollars involved.  In 1997, when procurement funding 
was relatively low, the Congressional Budget Office submitted its proposal to cut back on 
the amount of ships produced.151  Table 2, from the Congressional Budget Office, details 
its findings and recommendations.152  This option would have bought only 10 DDG-51s 
from 1998 through 2002 at a rate of two a year. Compared with the Administration's 
1997 plan, this option would have bought five fewer ships during CY98-02 period and 
could have saved about $551 million in budget authority in 1998 and $4 billion over five 
years.  (Outlay savings reached $27 million in 1998 and $1.4 billion over five years)  Of 
the $4 billion in budget authority savings associated with this option, about $3 billion 
resulted from building five fewer ships and $1B from consolidating construction at one 
shipyard. 
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REDUCED PROCUREMENT OF DDG-51 DESTROYERS 
 
Annual Savings       Five-Year 
Savings from   (Millions of dollars)  Cumulative 
the 1997 Plan  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 
 
Budget Authority  551 660 777 879 1,149 4,016 
 
Outlays   27 127 274 431 585 1,444 
 
Table 2 Reduced Procurement of DDG 51 Destroyers (FY97) 
 
There has been greater pressure for programs to demonstrate cost reductions and 
projected savings in the last ten years.  If Congress believes reported savings projections 
from program officers, OSD, CBO, GAO and/or other governmental bodies, then the 
program may be identified for a budget cut.  For example, Congress assumed that a 
projected change order totaling $19.1M, for the DDG 51 program, accurately reflected 
the savings projected using a decreased learning curve.  The learning curve for the 
change order was three percent.  The program manager argued that the change order did 
not apply because its effects on reducing costs are maximized only if all ships are 
identical.  The reclama stated, “The DDG 51 class ships are implementing their eighth 
major combat systems baseline upgrade and third major flight upgrade in FY02 alone.  
The ship is using its second version of the SPY-1 radar, second generation of the five-
inch gun, second upgrade to the ship self defense system and several other significant 
changes.”  The program manager added, “These changes are evolutionary and have made 
the DDG 51 a very different platform over the years.  While there are cost savings for 
those costs directly related to unaffected areas, the major changes have increased R&D 
and production costs.  As each of these upgrades has been processed, the learning curve 
has resulted in a reduced cost for ships subsequent to that on which the upgrade was first 
incorporated.”   
 
Furthermore the PM wrote, “These upgrades have been incorporated as baseline 
requirements in the affected shipbuilding contracts.  They were not considered change 
orders.  This maximizes the cost benefit to DON.  Likewise these upgrades place 
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additional pressure on change order budgets.”  The PM noted, “since the initial, non-
analytical, arbitrary Program Budget Decision 130 from 1992, the PM has indicated that 
these 3 percent change orders are insufficient to execute follow on flight IIA ships” in his 
reclama.  In this case, the PM’s reclama was due to projected learning curve savings from 
10 years prior. 
 
4. Memorandum of Understanding 
The Navy signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on June 17, 2002, 
with General Dynamics (Bath Iron Works) and Northrop Grumman Ship Systems 
(Ingalls Shipbuilding) to transfer ship construction between the two corporations' 
shipyards.  The MOU outlines the terms and conditions for transferring the construction 
of four LPD 17 ships from Bath Iron Works to Ingalls and Avondale shipyards in 
exchange for construction of four additional DDG 51-class destroyers at Bath Iron 
Works.  Under this plan, DDG 102, which was to have been built at Ingalls, will be 
transferred to Bath Iron Works.  LPD 19, in the initial stages of construction at Bath Iron 
Works, will be transferred to Ingalls.  As a result of this agreement, the Navy is expected 
to realize significant net cost savings on these programs. The arrangement is anticipated 
to provide for increased LPD 17 program stability and cost savings by centralizing 
production at one shipbuilder, Ingalls Shipbuilding, and improved workload stability at 
Bath Iron Works, which will build additional DDG 51’s in its new, more efficient, land-
level facility.  Because the cost savings were very optimistic, DAB directed the Cost 
Assessment Improvement Group (CAIG) to provide a realistic assessment of the 
projected cost savings.  The CAIG estimated the proposed savings were $118M less than 
predicted.  The LPD 17 CAIG independent analysis was done to provide realistic 
estimates for Congress153.   
 
Speaking about the agreement, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition, John Young Jr. said, "The Navy and the shipbuilders have 
taken a bold step today."  Young continued, "This shipbuilding transfer agreement will 
save the taxpayers money over the life of these two programs by dramatically reducing 
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the cost and schedule risk in the LPD 17 program.  The new FY02-05 DDG multi-year 
contract pricing and conditions were also negotiated in conjunction with the swap 
agreement."  Concluding, Young said, "The signing of this MOU and the new DDG 
multi-year contract stabilizes the workload at three shipyards -- Ingalls, Bath and 
Avondale, and provides a solid plan for almost $20 billion of Navy shipbuilding.  This 
agreement is a win-win for both shipbuilders and the Navy." 
 
Navy Secretary Gordon England said, "The award of the DDG 51 multiyear 
contract today is not only a significant milestone for one of the Navy's most successful 
acquisition programs, but also the cornerstone for the completion of the DDG 51 and 
LPD 17 workload exchange agreement.  The DDG multiyear contract and the workload 
exchange agreement will save the taxpayers more than $500M through the life of these 
two programs and provide for increased workload stability at Bath, Ingalls and Avondale 
shipyards.  This award is a testament to the teamwork, professionalism and value created 
by our industry and government team.  The agreement is also a testament to our 
partnership with Congress, as a number of key members have been instrumental in 
shaping and approving the swap and multiyear agreements."154  
 
5. Integrated Product Teams 
There is a much greater emphasis on teaming with the LPD 17 program.  Its teams 
are co-located, vertically and horizontally integrated and solve problems through 
teaming.  To make the most of an IPPD structured - program, nearly all members of 
Team 17 have been collocated on the grounds of Litton Avondale's shipyard in New 
Orleans for nearly two years.  For the first time during a shipbuilding program, the Navy 
and the contractor work side by side at a single location. The IPT allows the PM to 
benefit from extensive experience from a diverse group of acquisition professionals.  
Instead of having different contractors coordinating their efforts while the ship is under 
construction, a team is working to design and integrate the ship's systems at the same site.  
This environment has reportedly streamlined communication and enhanced decision-
making.  
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 In addition to design work begun for the new class, Litton Avondale constructed a 
series of pilot ship sections to demonstrate the maturity of the design and efficient 
production processes.155  The LPD 17 design includes systems configurations that reduce 
operating and support costs and facilitate operational performance improvements.  
System engineering and integration efforts have developed further reductions in life cycle 
costs and integrated performance upgrades.   
 
To gain every advantage from Sailor and Marine expertise, PMS 317 
implemented the Virtual Crew.  The Virtual Crew conducted fifty-nine Virtual Crew 
sessions that reviewed over three hundred individual ship spaces. The results were 
impressive.  Better than fifteen percent of the five hundred fifteen recommendations 
provided by the crew have led to actual changes in the design.  Thirty-seven percent of 
those recommendations validated the design.  The most significant achievement is that 
the team incorporated engineering changes into detailed design more than three years 
early, when changes can be made more easily and at less cost. 156   
 
6. Operational Testing 
Even before the Arleigh Burke destroyer was completely built, Commander, 
Operational Test and Evaluation Force was involved in the initial phases of testing. New 
systems, operated by fleet sailors ashore, were examined at land-based test facilities.  The 
combat system test and the propulsion plant test results supported the acquisition decision 
to begin limited production of the ship class.   
After commissioning, DDG-51 hosted follow-on operational testing throughout 
1992.  This test revealed engineering problems that required resolution by the design and 
production groups.  An additional phase of testing was added to retest the engineering 
solutions to those problems.  After this test, more follow-on testing was conducted in 
USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54) in 1994.  The Curtis Wilbur test focused on antisubmarine 
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warfare.  The 5"/54 gun weapon system merited its own separate test due to the system’s 
complexity.157   
 
The value of operational testing and development testing is emphasized in LPD 
17’s program office.  Though it has not reached the OTE phase, OT has been emphasized 
from the beginning.  LPD 17’s goal is to eliminate the problems encountered in DDG 51 
and earlier platforms.  LPD 17 incorporates developmental testing (DT) and operational 
testing (OT).  The LPD 17 Test Team has reinvented the approach used to implement 
both test philosophies.  The primary emphasis of DT is to ensure the ship is capable of 
performing its mission based on the satisfactory demonstration of established critical 
technical parameters.  OT, on the other hand, is structured to determine the effectiveness 
and suitability of a system under operationally realistic conditions; and to determine if the 
minimum acceptable operational performance requirements, as specified in the 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD), have been satisfied.   
 
The LPD 17 Test Team pulled forward Operational Test requirements in a 
concept called "Continuous Operational Assessment".  Areas of potential risk were 
identified and corrections to deficiencies developed and incorporated.  This concept 
emphasizes operational considerations as part of the ship design process.  Significant 
benefits continue to be derived from early "Operational Tester" involvement in the 
program.  Potential problems in ship design and construction from the Operator's 
viewpoint have been identified early in the design process and are being eliminated thus 
avoiding rework.  The team accomplished this through the use of a Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) with Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force 
(COMOPTEVFOR) to conduct Operational Assessments as part of the design cycle.  
Using this approach, the program manager significantly reduced risk and total ownership 
costs.  Costly rework will also be avoided. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
In summary, seven points from the earlier chapters are addressed for “fit”.  Do 
LPD 17 and DDG 51 as major weapons programs, have the same concerns as those 
expressed by former program managers?  There were seven points that served as the basis 
for the nine programmatic techniques discussed in Chapter IV.  The challenge for 
program managers is that they are forced to make hard choices in a resource-constrained 
world.  When dealing with military weapons procurement, an additional challenge is that 
at any time resources change or can be taken away through Congressional, or higher 
departmental action.  DDG 51 and LPD 17 appear to be a large growth in efforts to team 
from the beginning.  LPD 17 emphasized teaming and in fact, used teams to tie most of 
its groups.  DDG 51 emphasized teaming through reengineering.   
 
1. Unreasonable Assumptions 
LPD 17 advertised $500M in life cycle cost savings, but upon review by CAIG it 
was determined that the estimated savings were $118M less than projected or 24 percent 
less.  For DDG 51, it has performed well and arguably has met expectations.  LPD 17 is 
too new to know the real implications of this ship’s effectiveness.   
 
2. FYDP Funding Bow Wave 
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Taking a quick look at Table 2, DOD’s Most Expensive Weapon Systems, shows 
there are more requirements than available funds.  DOD cuts and reinstates funds 
regularly.  LPD 17 has been given more advance procurement funds in the last few years.  
It has had considerable funds taken away too.  Lawmakers are providing advance funding 
for ships upwards of 4 years in advance of need to secure the program’s life and to keep 
constituents employed.  DOD repeatedly shifts planned funding increases for modern 
weapon systems further into the future with each succeeding future years defense plan 
(FYDP).  As DOD reduces programmed procurement in successive FYDPs, it has 
reprogrammed some procurement to the years beyond the FYDP creating a bow wave of 
demand for procurement funds.   
3. Alternative Weaponry Should Be Considered 
The costs associated with constructing new weapons have increased dramatically 
over the past few years.  More funding will be required to complete construction of 
several types of ships.  The LPD 17 has experienced excessive cost increases partly 
attributed to design delays and a shortage of experienced personnel.  In 2001, DOD 
estimated that to build twelve ships it would need $10.6B.  Now DOD believes it will 
require $15.1B to build these same twelve ships, a forty two percent increase (FY03 
Budget).158  DOD has undertaken a number of initiatives to enhance its ability to monitor 
and take action on cost growth and schedule delays in the ship construction program.  
Arguably, Avondale does not have the in-house expertise to integrate the ship’s systems.   
 
4. Overestimated Funding 
DOD’s culture to generate new weapons by overestimating necessary funding and 
underestimating program costs appears to ring true for these programs. LPD 17’s costs 
are over target.  It begs the question of how much of that was due to underbidding by the 
contractor and the use of the PM’s best cost estimate to help sell the program’s cost 
effectiveness. 
 
5. Insufficient OTE 
In both cases, there appears to have been concerted efforts to have successful 
OTE.  DDG 51’s OTE was evolutionary.  DDG 54, USS Curtis Wilbur completed the 
most thorough OTE, as the fourth ship in the class.  Anecdotally, DDG 51, USS Arleigh 
Burke is nicknamed ‘Always Broke’ for its record of high maintenance repairs.  Follow-
on ships in the class do not share in that record and have very high reliability. 
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6. LRIP Begun Too Soon 
Pressure to deliver LPD 17 is growing because of design delays.  As the program 
managers interviewed said, ‘there is a part where costs escalate and you have to deliver 
the product.”   
 
7. Systems Do Not Match Requirements 
DDG 51 is a cheaper alternative to the CG 47, Ticonderoga Class Cruiser.  Its 
selection was based on evaluating projected savings versus CG 47 upgrades.  DDG 51 
has proven to be a reliable and successful platform for the Navy.  Both programs cost 
more than predecessor systems.  LPD 17 was chosen for its operational flexibility over 
cheaper, less costly, less complex competition.159  LPD 17 is designed to replace four 
amphibious ship platforms. 
 
LPD 17 and DDG 51 make claims of cost savings, but savings may be hard to 
justify.  Problems and hidden costs of untried practices have hampered LPD 17.  
Nevertheless, positive corrections were made when the MOU was signed between the 
shipyards to save dollars.  For Congress, OSD, DAB and the program manager, there 
must be a balance between long term savings and near-term investments.  The final cost 
depends on factors beyond the program manager’s control.  Unknown factors like 
Congressional direction; the current shape of the industrial base; and budget priorities and 
allocation affect funding.   
 
This concludes the data portion of the thesis.  The next chapter summarizes the 
information presented, discusses it and concludes in hopes of determining if DOD 
acquisition reform in the past ten years has been a help or hindrance for weapons 
procurement. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis posed the question of whether ten years of DOD procurement reform 
has helped or hindered acquisition reform.  The answer to that question started with a 
broader view of DOD, winnowing down to the Navy’s program manager, revealing 
techniques employed by them to manage funds.  Simply stated, there are many variables 
that are central to the question.  This chapter gets to the gist of the thesis.  After siphoning 
through mounds of paperwork, websites, interviews, phone calls and emails, etc. the 
pressure to find a bottom line for the next step for acquisition reform grew.  I will start 
with a short review, followed by analysis of the US’ budgetary environment and national 
interest, and concluding with a discussion and recommendation for continued Navy 
procurement reforms. 
 
Before acquisition reform, the process of acquiring new weapons was beset with 
loopholes and excesses.  Congress wanted the system reformed because years of 
excessive specifications and unclear requirements dictated details of how a weapon 
system “should” perform.  This served to increase costs.  Cost as an independent variable 
and allowing commercial off the shelf purchases were designed to lower procurement 
costs.   
 
Many programs that were introduced in the earlier part of the thesis were not 
mentioned in later portions.  The reasons for this fall into the following categories.  The 
law or regulation proved to have little relevance in day-to-day program management.  
The program managers interviewed were not familiar with the initiatives and ignored or 
were not aware of them for practical reasons.  Ignoring the regulations discussed earlier is 
not an admission of irrelevance, but instead is an admission that this thesis may not have 
captured the essence of programmatic reforms, because the correct questions may not 
have been asked.   
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 The end game for Congress and the nation is to save resources where possible so 
that the nation can purchase more of what it needs.  Yet, despite acquisition changes 
enacted by Congress, they (Congress) serve as the single most unpredictable variable 
when it comes to procuring weapons.  Congress intervenes with pork legislation like the 
advance procurement funds for LPD 17 for ships that are four years away from starting 
construction.  It seems that powerful members of Congress can keep an unnecessary 
program funded for years. 
 
B. PRIMARY INTERESTS FOR CHANGE 
 
An age of fiscal restraint for the federal government with corresponding 
ballooning surpluses constantly reminded the defense establishment that the go-go days 
of the 1980s were over.  The years 1989 through 1991 represented a watershed event for 
the world.  The threat changed after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union broke up 
into several smaller, diverse republics.  Eastern bloc countries embraced capitalism.  A 
new world order was ushered in.  A new world order existed that created a void where the 
Soviets once stood.  Some thought the new world order demanded the United States get 
involved in humanitarian engagements.  And the US did - at least for a while.  For now, 
the world does not have bipolar states battling for a desired way of life.   
 
Unipolarity exists with the US as the lead nation, exerting diplomatic and military 
might to keep national and international peace and economic stability.  The US is 
stretched thin, so the need for weapons procurement savings is greater than before.  On 
balance, with the end of the Cold War, US forces do not need to be kept in the high states 
of readiness they were before.  Then again, how else is the US going to be ready for the 
next world challenge?  National interest questions are not for debate on political 
hegemony, but speak directly to the weapons needed in a new world order. 
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On the domestic front, how does the US fare in all this?  Despite cuts in the US 
defense budget since the end of the Cold War, the United States reportedly accounts for 
one-third of all military spending in the world.  As the world’s self-appointed policeman 
(at least in matters that are directly related to the national interest) that number appears 
reasonable.  The US military is far superior to any of its rivals or allies.  It is true that 
some existing weapon systems are in desperate need of repair.  It’s also true that some 
existing systems should be retired because they no longer effectively meet the threat. 
 
The challenge for procurement reform is that the US has to be able to defend its 
national interests with technologically effective weapons.  Effective weapons are 
designed, produced and executed as intended.  Technologically “superior” weapons do 
the same thing and more.  It may be overkill to seek “superior” weapons for every 
eventuality and it costs more.  Resources are limited.  Why kill a fly with a bazooka when 
a simple fly swatter would do?  US national interests are global and defending its 
interests demands a military with global reach.  Military weapons must be able to reach 
far corners of the world to meet today’s challenges.  Today’s challenges are for a 
transformational force that is capable of defeating a stealth enemy.  The issues with 
procurement have been documented and discussed throughout this paper.  Given those 
issues, where do we go from here?  Specifically, what is the next step given the fact that 
despite significant acquisition reform legislation, the military spends even greater funds 
for newer weapons?   
 
The question of a new world order beckons.  Are we in the midst of a new world 
order or are we transitioning into that new world order?  If we are in transition, what will 
the final outcome be?  Seven or eight years ago, experts argued that the new world order 
encompassed small nations fighting for suppressed liberties and freedom.  This is correct.  
It is also correct to assume that the new world order encompasses non-state actors 
fighting for a voice through violent means (terrorists).  The bottom line for the US is that 
it has to be prepared to defend its national interests with a weapons procurement policy 
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that is more flexible, cheaper, more responsive and less hindered by political 
manipulation to win votes.  The US needs acquisition reform that works – better.  
 
C. CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
There is a military culture to produce the most dynamic weapons with the greatest 
technology, albeit it is less pervasive than it was 10 years ago.  Congress encourages this 
culture by allowing key committee members (HASC, SASC, Appropriations, etc.) the 
ability to push pork through for the sake of votes.  Congress and DOD must have a 
determination that the national interest is greater than the need to add pork legislation for 
the latest technological marvel.  Cancellation of Crusader was a solid decision because 
the need for it was questionable.  Additionally, there was the issue of whether or not 
Crusader could be transported to the battle because of its excess weight.  Crusader was 
designed for an old enemy.  The Army has to be more mobile to fully engage in the war 
on terrorism.  The US military, like Crusader, is beset with slow, technologically old, 
cumbersome weapons that cost much and deliver little for the level of effort required.  
The weapon procurement system is weighed down.  It takes far too long to design, 
implement and produce weapons.  Stating the obvious is easy.  Finding a solution that 
remedies the design, EMD and production phase delays is not so easy.  DOD must 
aggressively pursue breakthrough technology before weapon system research and 
development.  Contractors are creative in designing weapons and should be encouraged 
to develop lighter, transformational weapons while bypassing excessive milestones that 
mire the procurement process.   
 
Recommended actions for continued improvements include first planning 
programs and resources on a joint mission basis to excise service parochialism and to get 
real cost savings form cross-functional weaponry.  DOD needs to make the war-fighters 
responsible for participating in the selection of weapon systems based on joint mission 
needs and deciding whether or not a program is affordable.  War-fighters, DOD and 
program managers need to measure schedule, cost and performance tradeoffs among 
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alternatives more rigorously before a particular approach is chosen.  Today’s push for 
transformational weaponry does not equate to the same force in thirty years.   
 
Because funds are not as abundant as before, a cultural change within DOD that 
actively seeks the best value weapons that meets the needs of the war fighter is necessary.  
Congress and the Pentagon need to take much stronger actions to effectively control the 
influence of the acquisition culture, particularly as it generates and supports the 
acquisition of new weapon systems that do not necessarily satisfy the most critical 
requirements at minimal cost and willingly commits more procurement funds to 
programs than can reasonably be expected to be available in future defense budgets. 
Industry has to partner with DOD to make this happen.   
 
The system needs to be responsive.  One possibility is to loosen restrictions on 
procurement regulations further.  With the current re-write and/or dissolution of DOD 
5000.2R, this suggestion is far from revolutionary.  It could be argued that it is 
evolutionary.  This time, enough regulations must remain to discourage excessive waste 
of funds, abuse from acquisition professionals and temptations from Congress to 
appropriate unnecessary weapons.  Program decisions must be linked in a more durable 
way to DOD's long-term budgets.  They must maintain continuous competitive 
alternatives to solve mission needs throughout the acquisition process.  The Standard 
Procurement System (SPS) and other user-friendly funds tracking software must get 
immediate attention.  Finally, DOD must conduct programs in an environment of stable 
funding and management.   
 
Acquisition reform over the past ten years has helped procure better, more 
efficient weapons.  There are downsides to the system, which have been discussed.  
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS AND 
ACRONYMS 
ACAT – Acquisition Category 
ADM – Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
APB – Acquisition Program Baseline 
ASN (RD&A) – Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition (CAE for the Navy) 
ATN – Alliance Test Network 
BA - Budget Authority 
C4I – Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence 
CAD – Computer Aided Design 
CAE – Component Acquisition Executive 
CAIG – Cost Assessment Improvement Group 
CAIV – Cost as An Independent Variable 
CAP – Critical Acquisition Position Description 
CNDI – Commercial or Non-Developmental Items 
CBO – Congressional Budget Office 
CENTCOM – Commander in Chief, Central Command 
CFE – Commercial Furnished Equipment 
CNO – Chief of Naval Operations 
COMOPTEVFOR – Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force 
COTS – Commercial off the Shelf 
CVN 68 – NIMITZ Class Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier 
CLINGER-COHEN ACT of 1996 – Information Technology Reform Act of 1996 
DAB – Defense Acquisition Board 
DDG 51 – Arleigh Burke Class Aegis Destroyer 
DIT – Design Integration Test 
DOD – Department of Defense 
DODIG – Department of Defense Inspector General 
DON – Department of the Navy 
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EMD – Engineering, Manufacturing and Development Phase 
FARA – Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 
FASA – Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 
FYDP – Future Years Defense Plan 
GAO – General Accounting Office 
GFE – Government Furnished Equipment 
GPRA – Government Performance and Results Act:   
IPDE – Integrated Product Data Environment 
IPPD – Integrated Product and Process Development 
JSF – Joint Strike Fighter 
LBTE – Design Integration in a Land Based Test Environment 
LPD 17 – Amphibious ship used for embarking, transporting and lending support 
to Marine Landing Force 
LRIP – Low Rate Initial Production 
MDA – Milestone Decision Authority 
MDAP – Major Defense Acquisition Program 
MEB – Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
MOCAS – Mechanization of Contract Administration Services system 
MOU – Memorandum of Understanding 
MS - Milestone 
NDI – Non-Developmental Item 
NOR – Net Offsetting Receipt – Collections from the public 
OGA – Other Government Activity 
OFPP – Office for Federal Procurement Policy 
OMB – Office of Management and Budget 
O&M – Operations and Maintenance Funds 
OMN – Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
O&S – Operation and Support Costs 
OPTEMPO – Operational Tempo 
ORD – Operational Requirements Document 
Outlay – An Expenditure or Liquidation of the Government’s Obligations 
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PDRR – Program Definition and Risk Reduction 
PM – Program Manager 
POM – Program Objective Memorandum 
PPBS – Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review 
Reapportions – Extending previously appropriated funds 
RDT&E – Research, Development, Training and Engineering 
Rescissions – Canceling new Budget Authority or Unobligated Balances 
RBA – Revolution in Business Affairs 
RMA – Revolution in Military Affairs 
SECDEF- Secretary of the Defense 
SECNAV – Secretary of the Navy 
SPI – Single Process Initiative 
SPS – Standard Procurement System 
SSBN - Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine 
SSGN – Tomahawk Launch Capable Converted Strategic Ballistic Missile 
Submarine 
TOA – Total Obligational Authority – Value of the direct defense program in a 
given year 
 
TOC – Total Ownership Costs 
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